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The whole issue of faith and credit as applied to the law of domestic
relations is difficult, and the books of the Court will not be closed on it for
a long time, if ever.'
I Introduction
At 12:50 a.m. on September 21, 1996, President Clinton signed into law
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).2 Congress passed DOMA with a
"veto-proof' majority3 in response to Baehr v. Lewin,4 the case that is likely
to legalize same-sex marriages in Hawaii and may ultimately require other
states to recognize such marriages.' DOMA establishes two objectives: first,
1. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit- The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,
45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14 (1945).
2. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1994)); see Peter Baker, President Quietly Signs Law Aimedat
GayMarriages, WASH. POST, Sept. 22,1996, atA21 ("[ThePresident] did itatmidnightbecause
that's when it deserved to be signed. The reasons the bill was brought to a vote were dubious."
(quoting deputy press secretary Mary Ellen Glynn)). Baker notes that the President signed the
bill because he supports the traditional notion of the one-man, one-woman marriage. Id.
3. See 142 CONG. REC. H7505-06 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (citing House Vote Roll No.
104-316, tally of342-67); 142 CoNG. REC. S10,129-01 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (citing Senate
Vote Roll No. 104-280, tally of 85-14).
4. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
5. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that circuit court
erroneously dismissed complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against constitutional-
ity and enforcement of Hawaiian statute limiting marriage licenses to member of opposite sex),
appeal after remand sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112, 116 (Haw. 1996); H.R. REP. No.
104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,2906 (noting that if Hawaii permits
same-sex marriages, same-sex couples will attempt to use full faith and credit to force other
states to recognize such marriages). In Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court considered whether
there were facts to sustain a claim, based on Hawaiian constitutional protections of privacy and
sex discrimination, against the Hawaii law that excluded, inter alia, same-sex marriages. Lewin,
852 P.2d at 53-68. According to the Lewin court, the right to marry is a fundamental right and
fails within the zone of privacy rights. Id. at 55-56. However, the court found the notion of
same-sex marriage not to be so deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of Hawaii to be
afforded fundamental privacy protection. Id. at 56-57. On the matter of sex discrimination, the
Lewin court noted that the Hawaii Constitution prohibits state-sanctioned discrimination on the
basis of sex and that the Hawaii marriage statute restricts marriage based on sex. Id. at 59-60.
First, the court ruled that the circuit court erred in concluding that homosexuals did not
constitute a suspect class for purposes of the Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause. Id.
at 58-59. Second, the circuit court erred in using the rational relationship test rather than strict
scrutiny to analyze Hawaii's marriage law. Id. at 58, 63-67. Consequently, the Lewin court
held that the marriage law presumably violated the Hawaiian Constitution unless the state could
justify the statute's sex-based classification with a compelling state interest and that the statute
was narrowly tailored to that interest. Id. at 67. On remand, the Hawaii Circuit Court found
that the state did not have a compelling state interest for this classification. Baehr v. Miike, No.
CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
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it permits states to ignore legal same-sex marriages of other states; 6 second,
it provides a definition of "marriage" for federal purposes.7 This Note exam-
ines Congress's exercise of a full faith and credit exception or "negative"
power in DOMA that permits states to ignore the acts of other states in the
case of same-sex marriages!
Congress cites the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause of the Constitution9 (the
Clause) as both the reason why DOMA is necessary and as the source of
congressional authority to enact it.'" The Clause states: "Full Faith and Credit
6. See Defense of Marriage Act § 2 (granting permission to states to ignore same-sex
marriages of other states). Section 2 provides:
POWERS RESERVED TO THE STATES.
(a) In General. - Chapter 115 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 1738B the following:
§ 1738C. Certain acts, records, and proceedings and the effect thereof.
"No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, orjudicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, ortribe respecting arelationship between persons ofthe
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship."
Id. At the time of this writing, same-sex marriages are not recognized anywhere in the United
States. See generally Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of the Same
Sex, 63 A.L.R.3D 1199 (1975 & Supp. 1997) (noting that, to date, persons of same sex may not
enter into marriage contract).
7. See Defense of Marriage Act § 3 (defining "marriage" for federal purposes). Section
3 provides:
DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE.
(a) In General. - Chapter 1 of title 1, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
§ 7. Definition of "marriage" and "spouse."
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of
the United States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."
Id.
8. The Defense OfMarriage Act: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 42 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1740] (statement of Prof. Cass
R. Sunstein). According to Professor Sunstein, "negative power" is the power to create excep-
tions to full faith and credit. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 7-10, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2911-14
(claiming Congress derives its authority for DOMA from Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause and that
DOMA was warranted because Clause would require states to recognize same-sex marriages);
142 CONG. REc. S4870 (daily ed. May 8, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles) ("Many States are
concerned that another State's recognition of same-sex marriages will compromise their own
law prohibiting such marriages .... '[L]egislators in 24 States have introduced bills to deny
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shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceed-
ings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof. 1 The enactment of DOMA reflects congressional
concern that if Hawaii permits same-sex marriages, then the Clause will
require other states to recognize those marriages. 2 According to DOMA's
legislative history, however, Congress believed that states rightfully could
raise a public-policy exception 3 to avoid recognizing such marriages. None-
theless, Congress and the states were unwilling to rely on this Court-created
protection. 4 Instead, Congress invoked the second sentence of the Clause as
authority to enact DOMA.1 Thus, Congress enacted legislation permitting
states not to recognize the acts of other states for the first time in this coun-
try's history. 6 Critics have argued that this enactment reflects a mis-
recognition of same-sex marriage'." (quoting unspecified Washington Times article). See Val-
erie Richardson, States Spurn Hawaii Gay Marriages Bill Would Reject Same-Sex Unions,
WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 1996, at Al ("Legislators in 24 states have introduced bills to deny
recognition of same sex marriage.").
11. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
12. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,2911
(noting proponents of same-sex marriage seek to require states to recognize such marriages via
Clause).
13. See infraParts 1I.B.2, I.C and accompanyingtext(discussingpublicpolicy exception
to full faith and credit).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 8-10, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,2912-14
(stating unwillingness by Congress to rely on Court-created exception and noting concerns
registered by 23 states that they would have to recognize same-sex marriages). The public pol-
icy exception is a narrow exception to full faith and credit based on the highly important internal
concerns of a state. Id. at 9; see also infra Part II.C (discussing Court-created exceptions).
15. See H.R.REP.NO. 104-664, at25-27, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,2929-31
(citing second sentence of Clause as authority for DOMA).
16. See id. at 26 n.64, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930 n.64 (citing acts of
Congress passed under Clause, all of which require recognition of certain acts of other states).
The acts cited include: Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)); Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-611, 94 Stat.
3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994)) (requiring States to grant full faith and credit to
child custody determinations of other States if consistent with criteria established by Congress);
Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4064
(codified at28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994)) (samewith respectto child supportorders); Safe Homes
for Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, title IV, 40221(a), 108 Stat. 1930 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2265 (1994)) (full faith and credit to be given to protective orders issued against
spouse with respect to domestic violence). Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 97 n.492 (1996) (noting that before DOMA Congress
had never enacted statute permitting states not to recognize judgments of other states); Mike
McKee, Gay Marriages Face Serious Obstacles, FULTON COUNTYDAILY REP., Dec. 17, 1996,
at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fulton File (quoting Evan Wolfson, cocounsel for
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understanding of the words and intent of the Clause and that DOMA is either
premature because no state currently permits same-sex marriages or unneces-
sary in light of the public policy exception to full faith and credit. 7
The questions raised by congressional enactment of DOMA under the
Clause go beyond the national policy differences over homosexual rights or
same-sex marriages.' The greater issue is whether Congress has authority to
permit states to protect themselves from unwanted policies of sister states or,
as DOMA's critics claim, to grant more autonomy to the states in a way that
may lead to isolation or "balkanization. '19 DOMA raises a novel question of
congressional power over interstate legal relations through the exercise of a
rarely used and seldom interpreted constitutional provision."
This Note explores the power of Congress to create exceptions to the
Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause using DOMA as the example. Part II of this
Note examines the power of Congress under the Clause from a historical
perspective in order to provide a better understanding of the Clause's scope
and meaning.2' In addition, Part II analyzes debates and draft changes made
during the Constitutional Convention,' as well as case law, legislation, and
scholarly discussions of the Clause since ratification.' Part II also analyzes
the exceptions to full faith and credit as a guide for a possible model of the
scope of this newly-exercised congressional authority.24 Part III discusses
victorious gay couples who brought Hawaii case). But see Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 8,
at 23 (statement of Prof. Lynn D. Wardle) (claiming that Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994), has "negative" dimensions and that Supreme Court has found Act
constitutional in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988)).
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 36, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2938-39
(dissenting view) (claiming DOMA is unnecessary and premature); Letter from Professor
Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. REC.
S5931-33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy, "Unconstitutionality of S. 1740,
The So-Called Defense of Marriage Act") (questioning constitutionality of DOMA under full
faith and credit).
18. See Laurence H. Tribe, 'Defense of Marriage Act' Proposes to Set States' Union
Asunder, L.A. DAILY J., June 4, 1996, at 6 (claiming that congressional exceptions to full faith
effecting "endless list" of areas would impact union).
19. Id.
20. See H.R REP. No. 104-664, at 37-39 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2939-41 (dissenting view) (noting Congress has rarely invoked Clause and Supreme Court
interpretation has been less than complete).
21. See infra Part II (analyzing potential basis for congressional exception power within
Clause).
22. See infra Part I.A (discussing Constitutional Convention debates of Clause).
23. See infra Part II.B (discussing post-ratification full faith and credit acts of Congress,
case law, and commentaries relating to congressional exception power).
24. See infra Part H.C (discussing Court-created exceptions to full faith and credit vis-a-
vis Congress).
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DOMA's creation of a full faith exemption for state recognition of same-sex
marriages in light of the constitutional history of the Clause. 5 It also dis-
cusses the potential scope of Congress's power today under the Clause,
assuming that Congress can exercise this power to create exceptions within
a unified federal system 6 Finally, this Note contends that Congress has an
exception power under the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause to enact legislation
that permits states to ignore certain acts of other states27 and that the Consti-
tution does not limit this power to providing specific exceptions for state
determinations of public policy similar to the constrained state public policy
exceptions currently recognized by the Supreme Court.28
11 Congress's Power to Authorize Exceptions to Full Faith and Credit
A. The Constitutional Convention
Because the Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of a
congressionally-authorized exception to the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause,
such as that contained in DOMA,29 an understanding of the framers' intent is
necessary to determine the limits of the Clause. In part, the Clause was a
carry-over from the Articles of Confederation?' Its inclusion in the United
States Constitution was not as contentious as that of some other sections," and
the grant of congressional power was somewhat of an afterthought. 32 There-
fore, the scarcity of available information regarding the drafting and inclusion
25. See infra Part I (analyzing arguments for and against DOMA as exercise of congres-
sional exception power).
26. See infra Part III (analyzing arguments for and against DOMA as exercise of congres-
sional exception power).
27. See infra Part IV (discussing logic of congressional exception power).
28. See infra Part II.C (discussing Supreme Court-created exceptions to full faith and
credit).
29. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (discussing only Supreme Court pro-
nouncement on constitutionality of congressional exception power where it did not decide
issue).
30. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, 3 ("Full faith and credit shall be given
in each ofthese states to the records, acts, andjudicial proceedings ofthe courts and magistrates
of every other State."); Jackson, supra note 1, at 3 (noting Constitutional Convention found
basis of full faith and credit in Articles of Confederation).
31. See James D. Sumner, Jr., The Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause -Its History and Pur-
pose, 34 OR. L. REV. 224, 230 (1955) (noting little controversy over adoption of Clause
compared to other provisions).
32. See id. at 231 (noting that "there were no references to full faith and credit in the
Hamilton and Randolph plans, nor in the Patterson suggestions .... Congress, in this clause
recommended by the Committee of Detail, was not given power to prescribe the effect to be
given sister-state acts." (citations omitted)).
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of the Clause33 is especially significant in light of the current debate over
DOMA and it may also provide a reason for some of the confusion over the
Clause's meaning since ratification. 4
The Committee ofDetail first presented the Clause35 to the Constitutional
Convention for consideration on August 6, 1787.36 The proposed wording
contained a slight change from Article IV of the Articles of Confederation. 7
In particular, the proposed wording included a new requirement to give full
faith "to the acts of the Legislatures" of each state.3" When debate on the
Clause began, this change was the original point of disagreement, and it was
the first step in increasing the scope of the Clause. 9 An increase in the power
of Congress followed.4"
The general inclusion of state legislative acts in full faith and credit,
which the Convention eventually adopted, arguably gives these acts extra-
territorial effect.4' Mr. Williamson of North Carolina objected to the addition
of legislative acts because he did not understand what the Clause meant, and
instead he moved to have the original words of the Articles of Confederation
incorporated.42 Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania and Dr. Johnson of Connecticut
33. See Jackson, supra note 1, at4 (noting that "[d]ebate on this subject as recorded was
brief and cryptic and participated in by but a few delegates").
34. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARiES ON THE CONsTITLTION § 1312 (Melville M.
Bigelow ed., 5th ed. Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1891) (1833) (describing two perspectives
that had already developed in early 1800s on power of Congress under Clause); see also Hall
v. Williams, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232,242 (1828) (criticizing Supreme Court's interpretation of
Clause in Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813)); infra Part II.B.1 (discussing post-
ratification disagreement among courts on full faith and credit). The Hall court stated,
"Indeed .... no doubt could exist in the mind of any lawyer upon the subject, but for the
construction supposed to be given to the constitution... in the case of Mills v. Duryee." Hall,
23 Mass. (6 Pick.) at 247.
35. See ARTHUR TAYLORPRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 723 (1941)
(detailing Convention records indicating Clause known as "Article XVI").
36. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONsTITuTnoN 563 (1937).
37. See id. (comparing language of Articles of Confederation with proposed language);
supra note 30 (noting appropriate text of Articles of Confederation).
38. WARREN, supra note 36, at 563. The Committee of Detail proposed the following
language: "Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the
records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and magistrates of every other State." Id.
39. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing initial debate on inclusion
of state legislative acts).
40. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text (discussing debate on increase in scope
of congressional power and objections to inclusion of legislative acts).
41. See infra Part II.C (noting extraterritorial effect as result of Clause); infra note 58 and
accompanying text (same).
42. See 2 1787 DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTruTION 1368 (Wilburn E. Benton ed., 1986)
[hereinafter 1787 DRAFTING] ("Mr. Williamson moved to substitute in place of it, the words of
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answered that they believed the purpose of the Clause was to coverjudgments
and insolvency acts.4 ' During this period, the states were passing acts for the
relief of insolvent debtors and the proponents of including state legislative
acts had an apparent desire to give these efforts "nation-wide effectiveness.""4
In an attempt to clarify the issue, Mr. Pinckney of South Carolina suggested
an addition to the Clause regarding the establishment of uniform laws on
bankruptcies.4 ' The suggestion that full faith should cover only bankruptcy
laws may reflect the discomfort of some delegates with a sweeping require-
ment to give full faith to legislative acts of other states, without exception.
At this point in the debate, Mr. Madison of Virginia made the first ref-
erence to congressional power when he agreed with the Pinckney amend-
ment, but also pointed out that Congress should regulate the execution of
judgments across state lines. Mr. Randolph of Virginia responded, per-
haps mistakenly,47 that nations do not execute the judgments of other nations
and proposed his own version of the Clause with no grant of power to Con-
the Articles of Confederation on the same subject. He did not understand precisely the meaning
of the article." (quoting from Madison's notes of Convention)). This volume provides chrono-
logical records of the debates by section of the Constitution. See also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 447 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter RECORDs] (pro-
viding parallel citation to Madison's notes of Convention included in 1787 DRAFTING, supra).
Commentators commonly cite to this volume. Therefore, this Note includes parallel citations
for the debates.
43. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1368 ("Mr. Wilson and Dr. Johnson sup-
posed the meaning to be that Judgments in one State should be the ground of actions in other
States, and that acts of the Legislatures should be included, for the sake of Acts of insol-
vency .... " (quoting Madison's notes)); 2 RECORDS, supra note 42, at 447 (same).
44. G.W.C. Ross, "FullFaith and Credit" in a Federal System, 20 MINN.L.REV 140, 146
(1936).
45. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1368 ("Mr. Pinckney moved to commit
article XVI, with the following proposition, 'To establish uniform laws upon the subject of
bankruptcies, and respecting the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange."'
(quoting Madison's notes)); 2 RECORDS, supra note 42, at 447 (same); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I., § 8, cl. 4 (providing congressional power to establish uniform laws on bankruptcy);
WARREN, supra note 36, at 564 n.1 (noting bankruptcy power was vested in Congress separately
on Sept. 3, 1787).
46. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1368 ("Mr. Madison was for committing
both. He wished the Legislature might be authorized to provide for the execution of Judgments
in other States, under such regulations as might be expedient. He thought this might be safely
done and was justified by the nature of the Union." (quoting Madison's notes)); 2 RECORDS,
supra note 42, at 448 (same).
47. See Ross, supra note 44, at 148 (noting that Mr. Randolph was "probably mistaken"
because this was common practice in civil law countries). Mr. Randolph, rather than being
mistaken about the practice in civil law countries, could have been concerned that this proposal
would give one nation (the United States) the authority to declare the execution ofjudgments
in the courts of other sovereigns (particular states).
1642
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gress.4' Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, perhaps because of the sugges-
tion by Mr. Madison, then proposed a version of the Clause containing an
authorization for Congress resembling that which eventually appears in the
final version.49 Under Morris's plan, Congress would establish the interstate
rules for the acknowledgment of all legal acts of a state and the effect these
acts would have." The Convention submitted the Pinckney, Randolph, and
Morris proposals to a committee.5
The committee version was a modification of the Morris proposal, but in
the portion of the Clause that involved the determination of effects it "re-
stricted the power of Congress to ... Statejudgments.'"2 When the Conven-
tion reconvened, Gouverneur Morris moved to amend the proposal to return
it to his original plan for the broad scope of congressional authority. 3 Dr.
Johnson noted that this would permit Congress to require the states to give a
particular effect to the legislative acts of other states. 4 Mr. Randolph ob-
jected to the Morris amendment because itwould permit Congress to usurp all
of the powers of a state, and therefore he wanted congressional power limited
to the effect of judgments alone.55 However, the Convention adopted the
48. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1368 ("Mr. Randolph said there was no
instance of one nation executing judgments of the Courts of another nation." (quoting Madi-
son's notes)); 2 RECORDS, supra note 42, at 448 (same).
49. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1369 ("'Full faith ought to be given in each
State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceeding of every other State; and the Legisla-
ture shall by general laws, determine the proof and effect of such acts, records, and proceed-
ings."' (quoting Madison's notes on Morris proposal)); 2 RECORDS, supra note 42, at 448
(same).
50. See supra note 49 (quoting text of Morris proposal).
51. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1369 (citing Madison's notes that committee
comprised Mr. Rutlidge [sic] of South Carolina, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Gorham of Massachusetts,
Mr. Wilson, and Mr. [sic] Johnson); 2 RECORDS, supra note 42, at 448 (same).
52. WARREN, supra note 36, at 565 (emphasis added). The committee version stated:
Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the public acts, records and
Judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature shall by general
laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be
proved, and the effect which judgments obtained in one State shall have in
another.
Id. at 564-65.
53. See id. at 565 (noting that Morris sought to replace "whichjudgments obtained in one
State shall have in another" with word "thereof').
54. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1370 ("Dr. Johnson thought the amendment
as worded would authorise the General Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of
one State, in another State." (quoting Madison's notes)); 2 RECORDS, supra note 42, at 488
(same).
55. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1370-71 ("Mr. Randolph considered it as
strengthening the general objection against the plan, that its definition of the powers of the
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Morris amendment on a vote of six states to three.16 The impact of this vote
is significant because the Convention gave Congress a power of greater scope
than any previous plan anticipated. 7 As a result, Congress could prescribe the
legal effect of all public acts and records, in addition to judgments, of one
state among the other states.58
Mr. Madison, whose initial views on the scope of congressional power
in the Clause the Convention rejected,59 proposed the final modification to
the Clause.' He suggested that the Convention should replace the preca-
tory "ought to," with respect to full faith and credit given in each state, with
the mandatory "shall," and the "shall," with regardto the power ofthe Legisla-
ture to regulate full faith and credit, with the permissive "may."6' There
was no dissent. 2 This change set the stage for debate in our legal history
on the mandatory, "self-executing" nature of the first portion of the Clause
and on Congress's limited use of its optional powers in the second portion.63
The Committee of Style made two final changes to the Clause prior
to approval by the Convention.' They replaced "Legislature" with the more
Government was so loose as to give it opportunities for usurping all the State powers." (quoting
Madison's notes)); 2 RECORDS, supra note 42, at 488-89 (same).
56. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1371 (indicating Georgia, Maryland, and
Virginia voted against amendment); 2 REcoRDs, supra note 42, at 489 (same).
57. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (noting lack of congressional power
in Articles of Confederation and proposals).
58. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 28 YALEL.J. 421,425-26 (1919) (noting that framers gave Congress powerto prescribe
legal consequences across state lines).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 46, 56 (indicating Mr. Madison envisioned more
limited role for Congress, but Convention did not agree).
60. See infra note 61 (indicating change to Clause).
61. 2 1787 DRAFrING, supra note 42, at 1371; 2 RECORDS, supra note 42, at 489. There-
fore, wording after Madison's change was:
Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature may by general laws
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof.
2 1787 DRAFrING, supra note 42, at 1371; 2 RECORDS, supra note 42, at 489.
62. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1371 (noting motion was carried nem. con.);
RECORDS, supra note 42, at 489 (same). Nemine contradicente means "[n]o one dissenting; no
one voting in the negative." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1036 (6th ed. 1990).
63. See infra Parts II.B, II.C (discussing disagreement among courts over whether Clause
was self-executing or whether it required congressional action, and impact of congressional
action in early full-faith legislation).
64. See 2 1787 DRAFTING, supra note 42, at 1371 (quoting text from Committee of Style
which appears in ratified Constitution).
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specific "Congress" and divided the Clause into two sentences.65 One com-
mentator has argued that the purpose behind the use of two sentences was to
reflect a clause of independently operating parts: (1) a general self-executing
requirement, and (2) an option for Congress to legislate specifically.66 These
dual functions resulted from the Madison amendment, however, and do not
rely on the stylistic change for their substantive meaning.67
Considering the mandatory nature of the Clause and its grant of con-
gressional power over interstate relations, it seems logical that significant
debate would occur over the Clause during ratification. 6' The records reveal
no such debate.69 The Federalist Papers mention the Clause only once.7"
Writing in the Federalist Papers, Mr. Madison noted that the Clause in the
Constitution was a great improvement over the one in the Articles of Confed-
eration, which was "indeterminate" and "of little importance,"'" because
justice would be more predictable and uniform under the new version.72 In his
view, the Clause represented one of the benefits of the Constitution.73
In drafting a constitution to forge thirteen states into one nation, the
framers intended the Clause to be a unifying tool toward that end.74 Justice
Jackson, a Supreme Court Justice from 1941 to 1954, considered the Clause
to be the basis for the creation of a nationally uniform justice system.' How-
ever, it is not apparent that the framers intended the Clause to fulfill Professor
65. Id.
66. See Sumner, supra note 31, at 239 (noting that framers use of two sentences was not
repetitious and unnecessary, but served to establish two independent parts).
67. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing effect of word change on
substance of Clause).
68. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 5 (noting lack of post-Convention debate).
69. See id. at 4-5 (commenting that Constitutional Convention, contemporary discussions,
and ratifying conventions failed to significantly debate enactment of Clause).
70. See TBE FEDERALISTNO. 42, at 285-86 (James Madison) (The Heritage Press 1973)
(discussing Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause).
71. Id.at286.
72. See id. ("The power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument
ofjustice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the effects
liable to justice, may be suddenly and secretly translated, in any stage of the process, within a
foreign jurisdiction"); see also George P. Costigan, Jr., The History of the Adoption ofSection
I ofArticle INofthe UnitedStates Constitution anda Consideration of the Effect on Judgments
ofthat Section andofFederalLegislation, 4 COLUM. L. REv. 470,474 n.3 (1904) (claiming that
Madison's concern was still merely effect of court judgments on neighboring states).
73. See Costigan, supra note 72, at 474 n.3 (quoting Madison on Full-Faith-and-Credit
Clause).
74. See Sumner, supra note 31, at 241-49 (discussing goals of Clause).
75. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 34 (claiming Clause is "the foundation of any hope we
may have for a truly national system ofjustice").
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Tribe's vision of the Constitution's "most vital unifying provision."' 6
Conceivably, the framers could have had a primary, general purpose of
federalism in mind that did not exclude other necessary uses. While estab-
lishing an overarching purpose of enhancing the union, the Clause at the same
time gave Congress the power to address details and problems that the framers
could not foresee.7 Justice Jackson believed that the framers and early Con-
gresses did not fully grasp all of the problems that the Clause could address,
or for that matter, could cause.7" The Convention's minimal debate on the
Clause supports his viewpoint.79 Regardless, the debates clarify that those in
support of granting broad powers to Congress in the Clause prevailed." The
framers did not know precisely how and why the country would use the
Clause in the future, but they explicitly gave permission to Congress to regu-
late its mandatory implementation."
B. Post-Ratification Acts and Court Decisions
1. The Early Acts and Nineteenth Century Full Faith Constitutional Devel-
opment
The First Congress exercised its powers under the Full-Faith-and-Credit
Clause when it passed the Act of May 26, 1790 (Act of 1790).' In the Act of
76. Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note 17,
reprinted in 142 CONG. REc. S5933 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(emphasis added).
77. See Sumner, supra note 31, at 242 (finding general purpose and other purposes).
78. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 6 ("I find no satisfactory evidence that the members of
the Constitutional Convention or the early Congresses had more than a hazy knowledge of the
problems they sought to settle or of those which they created by the faith and credit clause.");
see also Cook, supra note 58, at 433 (noting that "we do not know exactly what the members
of the convention expected Congress to enact in the way of legislation").
79. See supra notes 35-63 and accompanying text (highlighting disagreements and
discussing lack of clear definition of purposes of Clause).
80. See supra note 49-56 and accompanying text (noting victory for Clause granting
greater power to Congress).
81. "And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I
(emphasis added); see supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (claiming Convention did not
know precisely how Congress would use powers under Clause).
82. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1994)). Titled, "An Act to Prescribe the Mode in Which the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial
Proceedings in Each State, Shall Be Authenticated So As to Take Effect in Every Other State,"
the Act reads;
That the acts of the legislatures of the several states shall be authenticated by having
the seal of their respective states affixed thereto: That the records and judicial
proceedings of the courts of any state shall be proved or admitted in any other court
within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and seal of the court
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1790, Congress primarily addressed the manner by which the states authenti-
cated (seal, attestation, certification) the various actions of sister states and
included the requirement that states give such authenticated events the same
effect that they would have in the originating state.83 With the Act of March
27, 1804 (Act of 1804),4 the Second Congress broadened the Act of 1790 by
including the Territories, and by prescribing the effect of nonjudicial acts,
thus ending congressional legislation regarding full faith and credit until the
later part of the 20th century.85 However, these early acts did not settle the
scope and manner in which full faith and credit was to operate.86 The use of
the words "such faith and credit" in the Act of 1790,7 rather than incorporat-
ing an explicit prescription of the "Effect" of "records and... Proceedings"
from the Clause, resulted in an ambiguity.8 The Act of 1790 and the Act of
annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chiefjustice, or
presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that the said attestation is in due form.
And the said records andjudicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have
such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they
have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or
shall be taken.
Id.
83. See id. (detailing authentication procedures).
84. Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1739
(1994)).
85. See supra notes 16, 84 (reflecting lack ofnew congressional action between 1804 and
1980). Congress slightly modified the wording of what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1738 in 1948 for
clarity and harmony with what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1739. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1739 (1994)
(noting technical modifications made in 1948 according to Historical and Statutory Notes, and
citing 62 Stat. 947 (1948)); see also Jackson, supra note 1, at 5 n.23 (indicating there was
contentious debate over this change, despite unavailability of records). But see Costigan, supra
note 72, at 476 n. I (stating that Act seemed "to have been passed as a matter of course").
86. See Costigan, supra note 72, at476 (indicating differences on construction of Clause
and acts). Costigan states:
The question of the effect of the constitutional provision and of the acts... caused
much conflict of opinion. Many state courts held... [the constitution and/or acts]
did not mean to confer upon the judgments of courts of sister States any greater
rights than were accorded foreign judgments at the common law.
Id.; see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 185 & n.1 (1895) (citing 25 cases illustrating state
refusal to give conclusive effect to foreign state judgments). The Hilton Court observed: "In
the courts of the several States, it was long recognized and assumed, as undoubted and
indisputable, that by our law, as by the law of England, foreign judgments for debts were not
conclusive, but only prima facie evidence of the matter adjudged." Id. at 185.
87. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1994)).
88. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see infra notes 90-121 and accompanying text (comparing
New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Act of 1790 with United States Supreme Court's
early interpretation).
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1804 were ambiguous as to whether they required states to give the same
recognition to the outcome of the proceeding as the original state did, or to the
validity of the records of the proceeding. 9
a. State Courts vs. The Supreme Court
In Hitchcock v. Aicken,9" the New York Supreme Court91 of Judicature
examined the meaning and scope of both the Clause and congressional action
under the Clause.92 In a fractured opinion, the court recognized that the
Constitution created the mechanism to change the way a state treated the
evidence of the proceedings of sister states.93 However, Justice Kent,94
writing one of the opinions in the majority, claimed that the Full-Faith-
and-Credit Clause only required other states to recognize the acts of the
state of origination as evidence.95 He observed that it was up to Congress to
declare how the states should implement full faith and credit and that, in
exercising this power under the Act of 1790, Congress did not require states
to give conclusive effect to the acts of sister states.' In effect, Judge Kent's
89. See infra notes 107-09,144-50 and accompanying text (highlighting change between
Justice Story's position on "effect" referring to "acts" or "manner" in Mills v. Duryee, II U.S.
(7 Cranch) 481 (1813), and his later writings).
90. 1 Cai. R. 460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803).
91. Highest court of law in New York prior to 1848.
92. See Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Cai. R 460, 474-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (deciding that
Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause and Act of 1790 only required states to admit judgments of other
states as presumptive evidence out of courtesy, rather than as conclusive of issue). In Hitch-
cock, the court considered what effect a conclusive judgment from Vermont would have in a
New York court. d at 461. According to the New York court, the general rule of law was to
treat judgments of other states as those of foreign nations - as prima facie evidence open to
examination as they would be in the state that rendered them. Id. at 483. However, the court
said that the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause gave power to Congress to legislate the manner of
proving acts, records and proceedings among states, and their effect. Id. at 480. As a result, the
Act of 1790 declared the effect to be "such faith and credit" as they have in their own state. Id.
at 476, 480. According to the court, "such faith" logically amounted to less than "full faith."
Id. at 480. The clause was only meant to cover evidentiary matters decided in the other state.
Id. Therefore, under the Act of 1790, New York was only required to treat the Vermont find-
ings as presumptive evidence and could apply its own substantive law to the case. Id. at 482-84.
93. See id. at 480 (claiming Constitution provided means to change system as it existed
under Articles of Confederation by giving Congress power to act).
94. Justice Kent became Chief Justice and authored the opinion in Taylor v. Bryden, 8
Johns. 172 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811), which reaffirmed the decision in Hitchcock.
95. See Hitchcock, 1 Cai. R. at 481 (stating that "the constitution meant nothing more by
full faith and credit, than what respected the evidence of such proceedings").
96. See id at 480 (claiming that Act of 1790 left full faith in same position as it was under
Articles of Confederation); see also Taylor, 8 Johns. at 177 (reaffirming court's position that
judgment from another state was not conclusive).
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position denies the self-executing, mandatory nature of the first sentence of
the Clause.
The opinions of the justices in Hitchcock closely foreshadowed today's
debate over the power of Congress under the Clause and the purpose under-
lying DOMA.97  Justice Kent argued that Congress, through the powers
granted to it under the Clause, qualified the credit that states had to give the
acts of originating states.9 8 He believed that Congress was authorizing some-
thing less than full faith - an exception. Justice Radcliff wrote that absolute
full faith would lead to instability, interfere with jurisdiction among the states,
and allow states to prescribe the law to one another." In contrast, dissenting
Justices Livingston and Thompson "envisioned far greater unity among
states." °°
In this early period of the Union, the lack of consensus on the precise
meaning of full faith and credit extended to the federal courts as well.10' In
97. See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 257, 280-84 (1990) (discussing various opinions in Hitchcock and noting its majority
opinion displayed view of "interstate disunity").
98. See Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Cai. R. 460, 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) ("[T]his act,
without prescribing the effect, defines, or, rather, qualifies, the faith and credit they are to
receive. Instead offull faith and credit, they are to receive such faith and credit.").
99. See id. at 462 ("To allow them a greater effectimight be attended with much inconven-
ience,... produce an irregular interference ofjurisdiction between different states, and, in some
cases, . . . enable them to prescribe the law to each other. The consequences cannot easily be
foreseen." (emphasis added)). Cf. 142 CONG. REC. H7441 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement
of Rep. Canady) (concerning the plan to use full faith and credit to legalize Hawaiian homo-
sexual marriages throughout the country). Rep. Canady stated:
[It] is profoundly undemocratic, and it is surely an abuse of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Indeed, I cannot imagine a more appropriate occasion for invoking
our constitutional authority to define the States' obligations under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. As Representative Terrance Tom from Hawaii testified before
the Subcommittee: "If inaction by the Congress runs the risk that a single Judge in
Hawaii may re-define the scope of legislation throughout the other forty-nine states,
[then] failure to act is a dereliction [of our] responsibilities."
Id.
100. Kogan, supra note 97, at 283.
101. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 181-82 (1895) (discussing meaning of full faith
and credit). Citing circuit cases from 1794, 1811, and 1813, the Hilton Court observed:
The effect of these provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States was
at first a subject of diverse opinions, not only in the courts of the several States, but
also in the Circuit Courts of the United States; Mr. Justice Cushing, Mr. Justice
Wilson and Mr. Justice Washington holding thatjudgments of the courts of a State
had the same effect throughout the Union as within that State; but Chief Justice
Marshall (if accurately reported) being of opinion that they were not entitled to
conclusive effect, and that their consideration might be impeached.
Id. at 182.
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the 1813 case of Mills v. Duryee,0 2 the Supreme Court addressed the issue. 3
Writing for the majority, Justice Joseph Story, Supreme Court Justice from
1811 to 1845, concluded that constitutional and statutory construction were
necessary to understand the requirements of full faith and credit.!'4 However,
the scope of his constitutional construction relied on the second sentence of
the Clause to affirm congressional authority to enact the Act of 1790.105 In
construing the Act of 1790, the Court rejected the position taken by the New
York court in Hitchcock."° The Act of 1790, according to the Court, did not
merely provide for the admission of evidentiary records; it declared an
effect." 7 Referring to the "such faith" portion of this legislation, Justice Story
wrote, "Congress have therefore declared the effect of the record by declaring
what faith and credit shall be given to it." '° These words also ended an early
debate on whether "Effect" in the Clause referred to the "Manner" or the
"Acts.' 01 9 The Mills Court, in deciding that "Effect" referred to the "Acts" of
the states, thereby elevated and clarified the scope of Congress's power as
more than merely prescribing the procedural methods for interstate recogni-
102. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
103. See Mills v. Duryee, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 481,483-85 (1813) (deciding thatFull-Faith-
and-Credit Clause grants to Congress power to provide conclusive effect to state judgments in
other states and that Act of 1790 did precisely this). In Mills, the Supreme Court considered
whether a plea of nil debet ("He owes nothing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1046 (6th ed.
1990).) was good in response to an action of debt brought in the District of Columbia on ajudg-
ment rendered in New York. Id. at 481, 483. According to the Court, the validity of the plea
depended on constitutional and statutory construction of the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause and
the Act of 1790. Id. at 483. The Court said that the Act of 1790 was an exercise of Congress's
power to provide the mode of authenticating records and that it declared the effect of such to
be the same as would be given by the issuing court- subject to faith and credit of"the highest
nature." Id. at 484. In New York, the action was conclusive on the parties, and it therefore must
also be in the District of Columbia. Id. Therefore, nil debet was not a good plea in this case
because the current action was based on the authenticated record of the previous New York
action which was conclusive between the parties. Id. at 484-85; see also Jackson, supra note
1, at7 (providing historical footnote that Francis Scott Key unsuccessfully argued that previous
action in New York was merely prima facie evidence).
104. See Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 483 (stating that "[t]he decision of this question
depends altogether upon the construction of the constitution and laws of the United States").
105. See id. at 483-84 (noting Act of 1790 was exercise of congressional power under
Clause).
106. See Kogan, supra note 97, at 285-91 (noting Mills opinion was contrary to state court
opinions represented by Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 462 (1813), and Hitchcock v.
Aicken, 1 Cai. R- 460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803)).
107. See Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 484 ("It is argued that this act ... does not declare
the effect of such evidence .... This argument cannot be supported.").
108. Id.
109. See infra notes 136-57 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Story's later views
on what "effect" refers to and noting importance of distinction).
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tion of acts; it included the substance of the acts as well.' The Court also
had to clarify the meaning of "Effect" in the Clause."' In contrast with the
position of the New York court in 1803,12 the Supreme Court decided that the
only "rational interpretation" of the congressional acts was that states must
give the judgments of originating states conclusive effect."' In other words,
Congress, in exercising its legislative power to declare the interstate effect of
legal acts, declared that such acts were entitled to conclusive, full faith and
credit, by which all other courts of the nation were bound." 4 According to the
Court's statutory interpretation in Mills, Congress had declared the effect of
state actions to their fullest extent." 5 The Court did not decide whether
Congress could have declared anything less.
Dissenting in Mills, Justice Johnson expressed concern that if states were
to pass outrageous laws, and the Court then required other states to recognize
judgments under those laws, less unity would result." 6 His position was in
accord with that of the New York Supreme Court in Hitchcock."7 He argued
that background principles of law underlie the notion of full faith that did not
mandate universal recognition of state acts, and that unrestricted full faith
would not remove conflict among states, but instead would exacerbate
them."' As an example, he observed that true full faith would permit a state
110. See Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 484 (deciding that Act of 1790 required states to
recognize judgments as conclusive highest form of evidence).
111. See id. (stating that "[i]t remains only then to inquire in every case what is the effect
of ajudgment in the State where it is rendered").
112. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (noting difference between Mills and
Hitchcock).
113. Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 485 (explaining that Court could "perceive no rational
interpretation of the act of congress, unless it declares ajudgment conclusive when a court of
the particular State where it is rendered would pronounce the same decision").
114. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1994)) (providing records andjudicial proceedings of any state shall be admitted "in
every court within the United States"); Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 484 (interpreting Act of
1790 to require conclusive effect).
115. See Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 484-85 (noting Congress gave acts as much faith and
credit as possible).
116. See id. at 486-87 (Johnson, J. dissenting) (stating that "if the states are at liberty to
pass the most absurd laws.., and we... [put] it out of our power to prevent the execution of
judgments obtained under those laws, certainly an effect will be given to that article of the
constitution in direct hostility with the object of it").
117. See id. at 486 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (noting that "faith and credit are terms strictly
applicable to evidence"); supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing Hitchcock
ruling).
118. See Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 485-86 (Johnson, J. dissenting) (claiming that canons
of common law were relevant and that Court should not dispense with "eternal principles of
justice").
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to exercise jurisdiction over property outside the reach of its process and
would force another state to enforce a judgment over this property.119 He
noted a danger in the Court's broad interpretation of what the Constitution and
the Act of Congress required of the states:120 Too much faith and credit may
divide rather than unite.
121
Interestingly, the Clause does not provide Congress with the authority for
those portions of the Acts of 1790 and 1804 that cover the District of Colum-
bia, the territories, Indian nations, or that make judgments conclusive in all
courts within the United States, rather than just state courts." The Court in
Embry v. Palmer"z found the authority for these aspects of faith and credit in
other portions of the Constitution." Because Mills addressed the effect of a
state judgment in the District of Columbia, the Court should have decided the
case outside of constitutional full faith and credit considerations."z Mills and
Embry are, in reality, converse cases based on the power of Congress outside
119. See id. at 486 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (providing as example attachment of cask of
wine in one state and judgment on it in another).
120. See id (Johnson, J., dissenting) (implying conclusive full faith would promote conflict
among states rather than promote harmony).
121. See id at 486-87 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (discussing disharmony in union if conclu-
sive full faith is given).
122. See supra note 82 (providing text of Act of 1790); supra notes 84-85 and accom-
panying text (discussing addition of non-states to full-faith-and-credit statute).
123. 107 U.S. 3 (1882).
124. See Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1882) (deeming congressional authority
outside of Clause). The Court stated:
The power to prescribe what effect shall be given.., is conferred by other pro-
visions of the Constitution... which declare the extent of the judicial power of
the United States, [and] which authorize all legislation necessary and proper....
As part of its general authority, the power to give effect to the judgments of its
courts is coextensive with its territorial jurisdiction... [and] the right of exclusive
legislation over the District [of Columbia] which the constitution has given to
Congress.
Id. In Embry, the Court considered whether a state court could set aside a contract judgment
from the District of Columbia. Id. at 10. According to the Embry Court, the power of Congress
to declare the effect ofjudgments among states is provided by the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause,
but, where one of the jurisdictions is not a state, Congress can declare the effect under its
powers concerning the judiciary, the District of Columbia, or under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Id. at 9-10. By the Acts of 1790 and 1804, Congress put all of the courts in the United
States on the same footing for recognition ofjudgments. Id. The Embry Court concluded that
Connecticut could only refuse to recognize the judgment if it was subject to some deficiency
in the District of Columbia. d. at 10. After reviewing the law governing the District of Colum-
bia at the time, the Court concluded that Connecticut failed to properly apply these principles.
Id. at 11-18. Therefore, the Embry Court found the judgment conclusive between the parties
and Connecticut's refusal to recognize the judgment was in error. Id. at 19.
125. See id. at 9 (noting power of Congress outside of full faith and credit).
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of the Clause.'26 Therefore, DOMA would still be a legitimate use of power
applicable to the District of Columbia, the territories, possessions, and tribal
governments, 27 based on Embry and its progeny, 28 even if Congress was
without authority to pass it under the Clause.
Most state courts rejected the absolutism of the Mills version of the
conclusive effect portion of full faith and credit and adopted the Johnson
dissent.'29 Fifteen years after the Supreme Court's decision in Mills, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the Mills rationale in Hall v.
Williams.3° The Massachusetts court adopted the reasoning underlying the
Johnson dissent in Mills.' According to the Massachusetts court, Justice
Johnson's reasoning constituted the most obvious construction of the Consti-
tution and Acts of Congress. 32 Hall reflected the view of the state courts of
the time,' and these decisions are arguably the genesis of the court-created
exceptions to full faith.'34 Neither federal nor state courts universally adopted,
126. See Costigan, supra note 72, at 482 (claiming Mills and Embry are converse of each
other and outside of full faith and credit).
127. Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997) (defining the
scope of the Act using the following language: "[n]o State, territory, or possession of the
United States, or Indian tribe...").
128. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (describing congressional authority
to require full faith and credit outside of Clause).
129. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 185 n.1 (1895) (indicating 17 of 25 cases cited
in Hilton were decided after Mills); Kogan, supra note 97, at 290-91 (noting that most state
courts rejected Mills and followed contrary position of other state courts).
130. 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232 (1828).
131. See Hall v. Williams, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 232,242-44 (1828) (rejecting Mills opinion).
In Hall, the court addressed the issue of whether a foreign state's judgment was conclusive
when a party claims improper service. Id. at 239. According to the Hall court, a party had to
have an opportunity to attack the jurisdiction of the original court. Id. at 240. The court
observed that under the Constitution the original judgment is supposed to be as conclusive in
the second state as it was in the first, but noted state disagreement with this position. Id. at 241-
42. The Hall court took notice of the conclusive requirements of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813), and, in reviewing judicial
criticism of Mills, rejected it in favor of Justice Johnson's dissenting opinion. Id. at 242-47.
Consequently, the Hall court ruled that judgments of another state were not conclusive for
purposes of challenging jurisdiction. Id. at 246-47; see also Kogan, supra note 97, at 291 n.140
(citing Hall court's rejection of Story's reasoning in Mills in favor of Johnson's).
132. See Hall, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) at 242 ("[S]o palpable is this principle, that no doubt
could exist in the mind of any lawyer upon the subject, but for the.., construction supposed
to be given to the constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress following it, in the
case of Mills v. Duryee.").
133. See Kogan, supra note 97, at 290 (noting that, at that time, most state courts were
adopting Johnson's dissent).
134. See infra Part II.C (discussing modem Court-created exceptions to full faith and
credit).
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on either constitutional or statutory grounds, conclusive full faith and credit,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Mills.'35
b. Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries
Justice Story revisited the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause in his Commen-
taries on the Constitution'36 (Commentaries). Published twenty years after
Mills, Story's Commentaries contain an important discourse on the continuing
debate over the Clause.'37 Justice Story provides unique perspectives on the
Clause from early in the nation's history. According to Justice Story, the first
portion of the Clause, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State,""'3 is self-
executing.139 He posits not only that this first sentence requires mandatory
recognition of acts, records, and proceedings among the states, 40 but also that
it leaves "nothing to future legislation,""'4' "nor is it susceptible of any quali-
fication by Congress." 42 This would seem to make the early Acts of Congress
superfluous except for the procedural portions regarding authentication. I"
Story's position would also signal the end of DOMA, absent some other
enumerated power.
On the issue of congressional power, Justice Story's writings contradict
his own opinion in Mills." Sections 1312 and 1313 of his Commentaries
135. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 182 (1895) (citing different federal decisions on
full faith and credit); Kogan, supra note 97, at 269-94 (discussing development of full faith
constitutional law and disagreements over conclusive effect).
136. See 2 STORY, supra note 34, §§ 1302-13 (containing Chapter XXIX, titled, "Power
of Congress as to Proof of State Records and Proceedings").
137. See id. § 1303 (discussing Articles of Confederation); id. §§ 1304-07 (providing
history of how laws and acts of foreign nations were treated by other nations); id. § 1308 (exam-
ining three distinct parts of Clause); id. §§ 1309-10 (covering first section of Clause); id.
§§ 1311-13 (covering second section of Clause).
138. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
139. See 2 STORY, supra note 34, § 1308 (stating that "[tihe first is declared, and estab-
lished by the Constitution itself, and is to receive no aid").
140. See id. § 1309 (stating that"[t]he language is positive, and declaratory,... 'Full faith
and credit shall be given"').
141. Id.
142. Id. § 1308.
143. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1994)) ("And the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have
such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law
or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken."). This
section must be invalid under Story's position in his Commentaries. See supra notes 136-42
and accompanying text (discussing Story's position).
144. See Kogan, supra note 97, at 295-96 (claiming Justice Story rejected his Mills opinion
in Commentaries).
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focus on the meaning of the words "and the Effect thereof" in the Clause.1 45
In these sections, Justice Story reverses his position in Mills by claiming that
"Effect" in the Clause refers to the "Manner" by which one proves the acts,
rather than the acts themselves. 46 This conclusion is necessary in order for
Justice Story to claim that Congress has no say over the mandatory nature of
the first part of the Clause. He points out that if Congress cannot qualify the
mandatory nature of the Clause, then Congress's power must lie in declaring
the effect of the interstateprocedures of proving legal acts. 147 Otherwise, the
grant of congressional power makes no sense. 48 Once he claims that position
that Congress cannot modify the mandatory, self-executing portion of the
Clause, then "Effect" must be relegated to the "Manner" of authentication. 1
49
The Supreme Court has not adopted this position. 5
In Section 1313 of his Commentaries, Justice Story notes that it really
does not matter which interpretation of the Clause is correct because each
viewpoint recognizes Congress's authority to declare the effect of state judg-
ments, "so always that full faith and credit are given to them.' 5' Congress
exercised this authority in fully implementing full faith and credit by the Acts
of 1790 and 1804. Justice Story's statement reflects a logical flaw in his argu-
ment. The difference between each position is what the word "Effect" refers
to. 52 If "Effect" refers to "Acts" rather than "Manner," then the mandatory
nature of the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause must be subject to congressionally
imposed conditions. Otherwise the Clause is nonsensical if it means that Con-
gress can declare the effect, provided that the effect is nothing less than what
the first sentence of the Clause already makes mandatory and self-executing.
Such an interpretation would make the power of Congress a nullity.'53 Surely,
145. See 2 STORY, supra note 34, §§ 1312-13 (discussing second sentence of Clause).
146. See id (arguing "Effect" refers to "Manner"); supra notes 104-15 and accompanying
text (discussing Justice Story's opinion in Mills).
147. See 2 STORY, supra note 34, § 1312 (discussing two possible readings of Clause).
148. See id. (stating that "otherwise the power to declare the effect would be wholly sense-
less; or Congress could possess the power to repeal or vary the full faith and credit given by that
section").
149. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (claiming first sentence of Clause is
mandatory and unmodifiable by Congress).
150. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text (deciding "Effect" refers to "Acts"
in Mills). The Supreme Court has not contradicted this position.
151. See 2 STORY, supra note 34, § 1313 (stating that "each admits the competency of
Congress to declare the effect ofjudgments, when duly authenticated; so always, thatfullfaith
and credit are given to them; and Congress by their legislation have already carried into
operation the objects of the clause [by the Acts of 1790 and 1804]" (emphasis added)).
152. See id. § 1312 (discussing two possible readings of Clause).
153. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (noting Story's indication that such
interpretation would be senseless).
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the debate over this wordifig in the Constitutional Convention was not super-
fluous. 54 If "Effect" refers to "Manner," then the validity of the Acts of 1790
and 1804 is suspect because Congress declared the "Effect" of the "Acts." 
155
The Court has not questioned the validity of the Acts of 1790 and 1804.156
Therefore, it matters which version is correct. Justice Story's position in
Mills, that Congress has the power to declare the substantive effect of the acts
of the states, and his position in the Commentaries, that Congress only has the
power to declare the procedural effect of authentication are inconsistent.1
7
If Justice Story is mistaken in his Commentaries, then Congress has the power
to modify full faith and credit.
c. The Supreme Court Acknowledges Exceptions to Full Faith and Credit
Following Story's Commentaries, the Supreme Court considered the
meaning of the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause in M'Elmoyle v. Cohen.'58 The
Court relied on some of the words from the Commentaries, but it ultimately
limited the conclusive nature of other state judgments.'59 The Court, joined
in its decision by Justice Story, stated that the Constitution requires full faith
and credit, "independently of all legislation.""16 However, in describing the
conclusive nature of the judgments of one state, the Court indicated that the
154. See supra Part II.A (discussing Convention's grant of power to Congress in Clause).
155. See Costigan, supra note 72, at481-84 (discussing validity of Acts of 1790 and 1804
under Clause).
156. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481,483-84 (1813) (noting passage of Act
of 1790 in accord with Clause). The Supreme Court has not contradicted this position.
157. See Kogan, supra note 97, at 294-96 (pointing out contradiction between Justice
Story's position in Mills and his position in Commentaries).
158. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
159. See M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 326 (1839) (quoting from Justice
Story's Commentaries); id. at 327 (deciding that statute of limitations of enforcing state can be
defense againstjudgment from rendering state in accordance with requirements of full faith and
credit). The issue in M'Elmoyle was whether, under the constitutional and statutory require-
ments of full faith and credit, Georgia's statute of limitations can bar recovery from ajudgment
rendered in South Carolina. Id. at 324-25. The M'Elmoyle Court noted that the Constitution
and Act of 1790 changed the legal relationships among the states from the then-existing law to
require recognition of foreign state judgments as Congress mandates. Id. at 325-26. Citing
Justice Story's Commentaries for support, the Court concluded that ajudgment was only exam-
inable upon grounds that could render it examinable in the originating state. Id. at 326. The
M'Elmoyle Court decided that ajudgment conclusive on the merits was separate from ajudg-
ment of execution. Id. at 326-27. Therefore, the state enforcing the judgment could apply its
own law of remedy: Georgia could apply its own statute of limitations. Id. at 327. The Court
reasoned that under the concept of sovereignty, states must be free to operate their judiciary
based on their own policies. Id Consequently, the M'Elmoyle Court ruled that Georgia could
apply its own statute of limitations to a foreign statejudgment. Id at 328.
160. Id. at 325.
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Constitution's grant of power to Congress in the second sentence of the
Clause acts as a limitation on this command.' The M'Elmoyle Court ob-
served that the self-executing full faith and credit mandate of the Constitution
is subject to the conditions and limitations of Congress as to both manner and
effect.1
62
The Court further noted that even though the Act of 1790 made ajudg-
ment of one state a record unexaminable on the merits, such judgments did not
carry a power of execution into another state. Rather, the plaintiff had to
get a subsequentjudgment in the state of execution.' 6 The second state, while
bound by the law of judgment of the first state by the Constitution and con-
gressional legislation, could follow its own law of remedy 65 as a defense to
recovery. 66 The Court justified this position by noting that a forum state's
laws of remedy grow out of policy considerations for the people and property
within a state, which have their basis in state sovereignty. 67 Therefore, as
early as 1839, the Court recognized a state public policy based exception to
full faith and credit. 6 In addition, the Court apparently determined that the
Acts of 1790 and 1804 did not mandate an effect of absolute full faith and
credit.
69
The Court re-enforced the M'Elmoyle decision in Bank of the State of
Alabama v. Dalton.7 In Dalton, the Court again interpreted Congress's Act
161. See id. at 324-25 ("[T]hejudgment is a record, conclusive upon the merits, to which
full faith and credit shall be given, when authenticated as the act of congress has pre-
scribed.... The authenticity of a judgment and its effect, depend upon the law made in
pursuance of the constitution." (emphasis added)).
162. See id. (claiming that Congress prescribes both manner and effect of state acts).
163. See id. at 325 (noting judgments are not examinable on merits, but require judgment
of execution in enforcing state).
164. See id. (stating that "[tjo give it the force of a judgment in another State, it must be
made a judgment there").
165. See id. at 326 (noting examples such as "release, payment, or a presumption of
payment, from the lapse of time, whether.., by the common-law prescription, or by a state of
limitation").
166. See id. at 326-27 (noting recognition ofjudgments is exclusive of defenses based on
"right of the State itself to exercise authority over the persons or the subject-matter").
167. See id. at 327 (claiming state organization of its judiciary stems from its policy, that
statutes of limitations are manifestations of policy, and that state policies and issues of sov-
ereignty cover persons and property within states).
168. See infra Part Il.C (discussing Court-created public policy exception). But see Jack-
son, supra note 1, at 30 (criticizing M'Elmoyle as example of Supreme Court "transposing
conflicts doctrines into the law of the Constitution").
169. See M'Elmoyle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 326 (claiming congressional legislation is
conclusive ofjudgments, not execution).
170. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 522 (1849).
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of 1790." The Court ruled that the Act did not prevent one state from
passing statutes of limitation to bar recovery on judgments from other
states.172 The Court recognized the uncertain scope of congressional power
under the Constitution to further declare interstate effects, but did not decide
this issue."' Instead, the Court relied on statutory construction.174
In the Term after Dalton, the Court expressly reinterpreted its decision
in Mills. 175 InD 'Arcy v. Ketchum,176 the Court limited the broad interpretation
of the mandatory conclusive effect of the Acts of 1790 and 1804 in Mills.
77
171. See Bank of Alabama v. Dalton, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 522, 529 (1849) (finding no
exception in Mississippi statute of limitations for plaintiff and finding that statute did not violate
Clause or Act of 1790). In Dalton, the Court addressed the issues of whether the Act of 1790
bars a state statute of limitations from covering an act occurring in another state prior to passage
of the state limitation, whether such a limitation was binding on a federal district court sitting
in the state, and whether the statute of limitations contains an exemption for parties not covered
by the statute until the suit is filed. Id. at 522, 526-29. The Dalton Court recognized that state
statutes of limitations provide rules of decision for federal courts sitting in that state. Id. at 527.
The Court further noted that the Act of 1790 provided conclusive effect ofjudgments between
parties, but did not require other states to enforce the judgment. Id. at 527-28. The Dalton
Court refused to read into the Mississippi statute an exemption for parties outside of Mississippi
until one of them filed a suit for judgment in Mississippi. Id. at 528-29. Consequently, the
Court upheld the Mississippi statute and found that the statute covered the suit. Id. at 527-29.
172. See id. at 528 ("That the legislation of congress, so far as it has gone, does not prevent
a State from passing acts of limitation to bar suits on judgments rendered in another State, is the
settled doctrine of this court." (citing M'Elmoyle)).
173. See id. (falling to decide scope of congressional power to declare effect of interstate
acts). The Court noted:
As to what further "effect" congress may give to judgments rendered in one State, and
sued on in another, does not belong to this inquiry: We have to deal with the law as
we find it, and not with the extent of power congress may have to legislate further in
this respect.
Id.
174. See id. (indicating basis for decision was Court's interpretation of Act of 1790).
175. See Kogan, supra note 97, at 292-93 (discussing shift away from Mills to state view
of limitations on conclusive full faith and credit).
176. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
177. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 176 (1850) (holding that Congress did
not intend to include state judgments on validity of their own service of notice in Act of 1790).
The D 'Arcy Court considered whether the Constitution and Act of 1790 required recognition
by a court in Louisiana of a judgment from New York, in which a party received no notice of
the suit, even though such a suit was valid and enforceable in New York. Id. at 173-75. The
D'Arcy Court stated that in New York, D'Arcy could not make the defense of lack of service
since two defendants and his partner were properly served. Id. at 173-74. The D'Arcy Court
noted that according to the Mills decision, one could only attack judgments of a state if they
were subject to attack in the rendering state. Id. at 175. The Court distinguished Mills as only
applying to the facts of that case and concluded that the principle of Mills could not be applied
without exception. Id. The D'Arcy Court looked to existing principles of justice and inter-
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The Court constrained Mills to the proposition that, in declaring the effect,
Congress simply prohibited a second trial on the merits when properly
heard'7s and that the more sweeping full faith and credit principles in that
decision were open to exceptions.179  D 'Arcy, the Court ruled that Congress
did not intend to change the principle of law that existed among states at the
time of the ratification of the Constitution thatjudgments were void in another
state unless service on the defendant was proper or the defendant made a
voluntary defense." 0 The Court reasoned that this was the proper background
law and therefore the situation required no congressional remedy.'
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Clause as mandatory, but regu-
lable by Congress, led the Court to interpret the meaning of the Constitution
and the Acts of 1790 and 1804 together without ever delimiting the scope of
congressional power.' The Court did this in a period of deference to state
sovereignty' by weakening the mandatory aspect of the Clause on the states
national law to determine what Congress intended to remedy with the Act of 1790. Id. at 175-
76. Under the existing law, foreign judgments were void unless the parties received proper
service. Id. at 176. Therefore, the D Arcy Court ruled that state judgments were invalid outside
of the rendering state unless service was proper and that the state courts were correct in finding
exceptions to full faith and credit. i; see supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing mandatory conclusive effect of state acts in Mills).
178. See D'Arcy, 52 U.S. at 175-76 (limiting Mills decision). The Court stated that
"congress saw proper to remedy the evil, and to provide that such inquiry and double defence
should not be allowed. To this extent, it is declared in the case of Mills v. Duryee, congress has
gone in altering the old rule. Nothing more was required." Id.
179. See id. at 175 (stating that "as was then predicted, (and as has been manifest ever
since,) great embarrassment must ensue if the [Mills] construction, on the facts of that particular
case, is applied to all others, without exception").
180. Id. at 176.
181. See id. (relying on prior laws as appropriate remedy). The Court stated:
There was no evil in this part of the existing law, and no remedy called for, and in
our opinion, congress did not intend to overthrow the old rule by the enactment that
such faith and credit should be given to records ofjudgments, as they had in the
State where made. The language employed is not only fairly open to construction,
but the result arrived at by the court below, depends on construction; and when we
look to the previous law, and the evil intended to be remedied by the framers of the
constitution and by congress, we cannot bring our minds to doubt that the act of
1790 does not operate on, or give additional force to, thejudgment under consider-
ation ....
Id.
182. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing judicial development of full faith and
credit, not differentiating between Constitution and Acts of 1790 and 1804); supra note 104
(quoting Mills statement that its decision was based on Constitution and laws of the United
States). None of the subsequent cases differentiate between the Constitution and the Acts of
1790 and 1804.
183. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 7 (claiming that concern regarding "state sovereignty"
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through exceptions."' In doing so, Congress was also deferring to full faith
state court decisions before and after Mills."'5 Congressional inaction since
1804, combined with an unwillingness by the Court to give the Clause and
Acts complete conclusive effect, provided the opportunity for the Court to
develop these exceptions. As interaction among the states continued to
increase, a number of Supreme Court cases discussed the theoretical scope of
Congress's power to enforce or limit full faith."6 The enactment of DOMA
moves this issue from theory to reality.
2. Twentieth Century Supreme Court Commentary on Congress's Full
Faith Exception Power
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on whether Congress has the
authority to grant exceptions to the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause.1 7 The most
active period for Supreme Court full faith and credit decisions was the late
1920s to the middle 1940s,'88 with Justice Stone authoring important opinions
in the leading cases.8 9 Yarborough v. Yarborough, 9° a case in which the
judgment of one state conflicted with the public policy and property concerns
of another, 91 contains the first direct Supreme Court discussion of the author-
is explanation for different views of full faith and credit reflected in Mills and M'Elmoyle
opinions).
184. See supra notes 158-81 (discussing Court's weakening of Mills decision).
185. See Kogan, supra note 97, at 293 (claiming that on eve of Civil War, Supreme Court
deferred to state interpretation).
186. See infra notes 190-224 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases that
considered Congress's power under Clause).
187. See infra note 215 and accompanying text (quoting Supreme Court's refusal to
address issue in Yarborough). Since then, the Supreme Court has not readdressed the issue.
188. See infra notes 190-244 and accompanyingtext (discussing importance ofleading full
faith and credit cases from 1920s to 1940s).
189. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941); Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); AlaskaPackers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532
(1935); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting).
190. 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
191. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202,212 (1933) (requiring recognition of
Georgia judgment even though defendant has property in and daughter resides in South
Carolina). The Yarborough Court addressed the issue of whether South Carolina could require
additional support for a child residing in South Carolina, apart from her father, who was a
resident of Georgia with property in South Carolina. Id. at 204-07. The father had already
fulfilled his obligations to the child pursuant to a Georgia divorce decree. Id. The Court
observed that under Georgia law support for minor children is part of a divorce proceeding and
not a separate cause of action. Id. at 210. The Yarborough Court therefore decided that the
father's obligations were settled in the Georgia proceeding and were entitled to full faith and
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ity of Congress to create exceptions to full faith and credit.'92 Although the
issue in Yarborough was not the congressional exception power, Justice
Stone's dissent raised it as an issue directly related to the Court's exceptions
to full faith and credit. 93 Basing his analysis partially on M'Elmoyle"9
Justice Stone emphasized that the Court has never applied the Clause and the
acts of Congress without exception and that the Court found it necessary to
create such exceptions because the general terms of the congressional Acts of
1790 and 1804 provided none. 9 In a footnote, Justice Stone posited that
Congress must have the authority to either expand or contract the mandatory
nature of the Clause.'96 He reasoned that, unless Congress's power to pre-
scribe the details of full faith was broader than the Court's, Congress's power
to declare the "Effect" would have been unnecessary and meaningless because
of the Court's role in interpreting and enforcing the mandatory aspects of the
first sentence of the Clause.
197
credit in South Carolina. Id. at 212-13.
192. See id. (deciding full faith and credit required South Carolina to recognize final
Georgia child support agreement as part of divorce decree, even where child was not party to
proceeding); see also id. at 214-15 (Stone, J., dissenting) (discussing power of Congress under
Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause).
193. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stone's dissent).
Justice Cardozo joined Justice Stone's opinion. Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 227 (Stone, J.,
dissenting). The majority opinion failed to address the portion of Justice Stone's dissent articu-
lating the congressional power to create exceptions.
194. See Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 214-15 (Stone, J., dissenting) (citing M'Elmoyle).
195. See id. at 215 (Stone, J., dissenting) (commenting on Court's creation of exceptions).
Justice Stone stated:
[T]here is often an inescapable conflict of interest of the two states, and there comes
a point beyond which the imposition of the will of one state beyond its own borders
involves a forbidden infringement of some legitimate domestic interest of the other.
That point may vary with the circumstances of the case; and in the absence of
provisions more specific than thegeneral terms ofthe congressional enactment this
Court must determine for itself the extent to which one state may qualify or deny
rights claimed under proceedings or records of other states.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In this case Justice Stone believed that Georgia was
forcing its own public policy on South Carolina. See id. at 223 (Stone, J., dissenting).
196. See id. at215 n.2 (Stone, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he mandatory force of the full
faith and credit clause as defined by this Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined,
expanded or contracted by Congress" (emphasis added)).
197. See id. (commenting on Congress's power). Justice Stone stated:
The constitutional provision giving Congress power to prescribe the effect to be
given to acts, records and proceedings would have been quite unnecessary had it
not been intended that Congress should have a latitude broader than that given the
courts by the full faith and credit clause alone.
Id. (Stone, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stone relied on the debates of the Constitutional Convention
regarding the need for congressional power to declare the "Effect" 9  and the
Court's recognition of a public policy exception as support for his position.'99
Justice Stone believed that the debates led to the logical conclusion that the
Clause granted Congress broad power to regulate the effects of full faith,
otherwise there was no reason for the short but intense debate.2" Therefore,
the Court's problems in applying a public policy exception are a reflection of
its own difficulty in handling full faith matters in which Congress has not
yet spoken - one way or another."' Justice Stone's discussion of a congres-
sional exception power reflected his concemthat, absent congressional action,
the Court was left to develop exceptions on its own, on a case-by-case basis.
The majority neither accepted nor expressly rejected this portion of his
opinion."2
Two years after Yarborough, the Court, with Justice Stone this time
writing the majority opinion, again addressed exceptions to full faith in Mil-
waukee County v. ME. White Co. 3 In apparent contradiction with his dissent
in Yarborough, Justice Stone in Milwaukee County, when referring to limita-
tions on full faith, wrote, "[o]f that question this Court is the final arbiter."2
198. See supra Part II.A (discussing debate on Clause during Constitutional Convention).
199. See Yarborough, 209 U.S. at 215 n.2 (Stone, J., dissenting) (relying on public policy
exception for his position). Justice Stone commented:
It was remarked on the floor of the Constitutional Convention that without the
extension of power in the legislature, the provision "would amount to nothing more
than what now takes place among all Independent Nations." The play which has
been afforded for the recognition of local public policy in cases where there is
called in question only a statute of another state, as to the effect of which Congress
has not legislated, compared with the more restricted scope for local policy where
there is a judicial proceeding, as to which Congress has legislated, suggests the
Congressional power.
Id. (citations omitted).
200. See id. (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting importance of constitutional convention); supra
Part II.A (discussing debate on Clause during constitutional convention).
201. See supra note 195; infra note 224 (quoting opinions of Justices Stone and Black
indicating that Congress's failure to provide interstate direction on child custody matters and
divorces placed Court in position of developing solutions).
202. See Yarborough, 290 U.S. at202-13 (failingto discuss congressional exception power
which Justice Stone raised).
203. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
204. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 274 (1935); see id. at 280
(certifying that U.S. district court in Illinois had jurisdiction over parties in suit based on valid
judgment from Wisconsin state court). In Milwaukee County, the appellee claimed that the
Illinois district court should not havejurisdiction because: (1) the suit was not within the power
conferred upon federal district courts; and (2) ajudgment for taxes is an exception to the Full-
Faith-and-Credit Clause and the Acts of 1790 and 1804. Id at 270. The Court reasoned that
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The authors of the official notes and comments to Section 103 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which cited the Milwaukee County opin-
ion and another case °" likely relied on these words when they claimed that the
Supreme Court had the final word on full faith exceptions.2 6 The authors
viewed such exceptions as limited to very rare cases because of the important
unifying principles of the Clause. 7
If Milwaukee County was the source of the authors' statement regarding
the conclusive power of the Court, then their reliance was misplaced. In
Milwaukee County, Justice Stone made an assumption that the Clause and the
Acts of 1790 and 1804 were not all-encompassing.28 He thereby limited the
question to a narrow issue for the purpose of answering the certified question
in this case.2 This decision reflected his concern, expressed in the Yarbor-
ough dissent, that congressional inaction placed the Court in the unavoidable
position of deciding these conflicting policy cases, not that the Constitution
placed the Court in the position as arbiter of full faith exceptions to the
the judicial code permits a district court to hear the case because tax matters are not excluded.
Id. at 271. The Court noted that full faith and credit is not applied without exception because
of concerns regarding state sovereignty and that taxation is one of these areas of concern. Id
at 272-74. The Milwaukee County Court noted, however, that the Wisconsin action was not a
ruling on the merits, but ajudgment for enforcement. Id. at 274-75. Therefore, there was no
basis for denying full faith and credit. Id. at 276-78. Consequently, the Court ruled that the
district court in Illinois could enforce the Wisconsin judgment. Id at 279-80.
205. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945) [hereinafter Williams 11]
(ruling that North Carolina could ignore ex parte divorces performed in Nevada if parties ob-
tained Nevada residency for purpose of avoiding North Carolina divorce policy).
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICr OF LAWS § 103 cmt. b, reporter's note
(1971) (citing Williams Hin comment on rationale of Section 103 and Justice Stone's dissent
in Yarborough in notes).
207. See id. (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court of the United States has the final voice in
determining what exceptions there are to full faith and credit, and the nature of these excep-
tions").
208. Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 273-74.
209. See id. (limiting certified question to narrow issue). Justice Stone stated:
Without attempting to say what their limits may be, we assume for present purposes
that the command of the Constitution and of the statute is not all-embracing and
direct our inquiry to the question whether a state to which ajudgment for taxes is
taken may have a policy against its enforcement meriting recognition as a permis-
sible limitation upon the full-faith and credit clause. Of that question this court is
the final arbiter.
Id. For support, Justice Stone relied on his majority opinion in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus-
trial Accident Comm'n. See id. at 274 (citing Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)); Alaska Packers Ass'n, 294 U.S. at 547 (noting that
"[u]nless by force of that clause a greater effect is thus to be given.., it is unavoidable that this
Court determine for itself the extent to which the statute of one state may qualify or deny rights
asserted under the statute of another").
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exclusion of Congress." ' Only by examination of the context of Justice
Stone's opinion in Milwaukee County can one reconcile it with his dissent in
Yarborough. Justice Stone believed Congress should create the exceptions to
full faith, but in its absence he led the Court in doing so.2"
The Supreme Court continued to rely on the language from earlier cases
to declare itself the "final arbiter" of full faith exceptions.2' In the absence
of congressional action, the Court acted to protect its role in creating excep-
tions to avoid "absurd result[s]." '213 In Williams v. North Carolina214 (Wil-
liams 1), an ex parte divorce case, the Court repeated its claim of the right to
determine full-faith exceptions. But as in Milwaukee County, the Court
tempered its sweeping declaration in light of congressional inaction when,
referring to Yarborough, it stated:
Whether Congress has the power to create exceptions .. is a question on
which we express no view. It is sufficient here to note that Congress in its
sweeping requirement that judgments of the courts of one state be given
full faith and credit in the courts of another has not done so.
21 5
With that statement, the Court left undecided the issue now presented by
Section 2 of DOMA.216
However, the tension between Williams I and the Court's later decision
in Williams v. North Carolina.7 (Williams 11) demonstrated Justice Stone's
theory that the Court's difficulty in handling the public policy exception
210. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing lack of action by Congress).
211. See supra note 190-210 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stone's opinions
in Yarborough and Milwaukee County).
212. Williamsv.NorthCarolina, 317 U.S. 287,302(1942) [hereinafter Williams]] (stating
that "[t]his Court, of course, is the final arbiter when the question is raised as to what is a
permissible limitation on the full faith and credit clause").
213. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 294 U.S. at 547.
214. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
215. Id. at 303. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,299 (1942) (deciding under
Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause and Act of 1790 that divorce of bona fide domiciliary is binding
on courts of other states). In Williams I, two married persons from North Carolina moved to
Nevada for 6 weeks, obtained divorces, married, returned to North Carolina, and were subse-
quently charged with bigamy. Id. at 289-91. The North Carolina trial court refused to recog-
nize the Nevada divorces. Id, at 291. The North Carolina Supreme Court cited the United
States Supreme Court opinion of Haddockv. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1905), in sustaining the
trial court. Id. The Williams ICourt noted that Haddock held that the matrimonial domicile
where one spouse still resided did not have to give full faith and credit to divorces obtained out
of state. Id. at 293. Relying on previous cases requiring full faith and credit, the Williams I
Court overruled Haddock. IL at 295-304. Consequently, the Court required North Carolina
to give the Nevada proceedings full faith and credit. Id. at 304.
216. See Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997) (per-
mitting states not to recognize same-sex marriages of other states).
217. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
1664
DOMA DEFENSIBLE UNDER FULL FAITHAND CREDIT
stemmed from the lack of an explicit grant from Congress to create or deny
one." 8 The Court in Williams I struggled with the obvious benefits and
detriments of the public policy exception." 9 It overturned precedent to retreat
from the exception in favor of a more stable rule, thus denying an exception
for North Carolina." Williams I, in turn, was a retreat from Williams Iwhen
a plurality of the Court permitted North Carolina to ignore two divorces that
were legitimate in Nevada." l Justice Black, in his strong dissentm from
Williams II, argued that only Congress, and not the Court, could authorize
states to recognize lesser effect for judgments on a particular substantive
issue.' His view was that the Clause placed this power squarely in the hands
of Congress and that Congress had not yet declared any exceptions.224
218. See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); supra notes 195-202
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stone's response to lack of congressional action).
219. See Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 295-303 (distinguishing earlier Supreme Court cases); cf.
id. at 308-11 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id at 311-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 303-04 (overruling Haddock). The Court stated:
[T]he substantial and far-reaching effects which the allowance of an exception
would have on innocent persons indicate that the purpose of the full faith and credit
clause and of the supporting legislation would be thwarted to a substantial degree
if the rule of Haddock v. Haddock were perpetuated.
Haddock v. Haddock is overruled.
Id
221. See Williams 11, 325 U.S. at 239 (concluding North Carolina was not required to
recognize Nevada divorce decrees when parties obtained residency in Nevada to avoid public
policy of North Carolina). In Williams II, the Court recognized that the power to grant a
divorce is based on the domicile of the parties. Id. at 229. The Court also noted that divorce
and marriage have impacts beyond the immediate parties andtherefore concern the public policy
of the state where such acts are to have effect. Id. at 230-31. North Carolina, according to the
Williams I Court, could examine whether the parties actually abandoned their North Carolina
residency, notwithstanding the Nevadajudgment. Id. at 235-37. Because a fair trial took place
on the issue, the Court decided that North Carolina could examine this issue and therefore
upheld the second trial. Id. at 238-39.
222. See CHARLOTrE WILLIAMS, HUGO L. BLACK A STUDY IN THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 124
(1950) (noting Justice Black expressed "strong disapproval" over Court's opinion in Williams
223. See Williams 1, 325 U.S. at 268 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing authorization could
only come from Congress). Justice Black commented: "If... divorce decrees should be given
less effect than other court judgments, Congress alone has the constitutional power to say so.
We should not attempt to solve the 'divorce problem' by constitutional interpretation. At least,
until Congress has commanded a different 'Effect' ... we should stay our hands." Id. (Black,
J., dissenting).
224. See id. (Black, J., dissenting) (declaring Clause gave power to Congress). Justice
Black stated:
Congress in 1790 declared what law should govern and what "Effect" should be
given the judgments of state courts. That statute is still the law.... A proper
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By creating exceptions, the Court was interpreting the mandatory nature
of the Clause in the absence of a contrary exercise of Congress's optional
powers under the Clause. In their dissents, Justices Stone and Black argued
that the second sentence of the Clause grants this power to Congress, rather
than to the Court.' Congress has met the concerns of both positions in its
enactment of DOMA by using its optional powers to create an exception to
full faith while refusing to rely on the Court-created exceptions to advance the
same end.226
C. The Court, the Public Policy Exception, and Congressional Power
If no exceptions to full faith and credit existed, whenever an interstate
conflict arose, the forum state would have to recognize as conclusive the acts,
records, or proceedings of the other state to the exclusion of its own. 7 To
alleviate this situation, the Supreme Court developed limited exceptions to full
faith in light of background principles of law and powers retained by the states
over local matters at the time the Constitution was adopted.- 8 The 1978
decision in Nevada v. Hall' 9 is the Court's most recent reaffirmation of the
public policy exception."3 The Court quoted at length from Pacific Em-
respect for the Constitution and the Congress would seem to me to require that we
leave this problem where the Constitution did.
Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
225. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stone's opinion);
supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Black's opinion).
226. See supra note 5 (discussing potential requirement for other states to recognize
Hawaiian same-sex marriage).
227. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)
(commenting on literal interpretation of Clause). The Court stated:
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard
to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the
conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other,
but cannot be in its own.
Id.
228. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text (discussing Court's adoption of
background principles of law in D 'Arcy).
229. 440 U.S. 410 (1978).
230. See Nevadav. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,414-27 (1978) (ruling suit against State ofNevada
in California state courts did not violate sovereign immunity, Article III of Constitution, Full-
Faith-and-Credit Clause, or specific provisions of Constitution limiting state sovereignty). The
plaintiffs made the State of Nevada a party to a California tort action resulting from a car
accident in California that involved an employee of the State ofNevada. Id. at 411-12. Nevada
had a $25,000 statutory limit of liability as part of its waiver of sovereign immunity. l at 412.
In Hall, the Court for the first time addressed the issue of whether a state could claim immunity
in the courts of another state. Id. at 414. The Hall Court reasoned that sovereign immunity only
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ployers Insurance Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission,"1 which concluded
that the Acts of 1790 and 1804 did not prescribe the interstate effect for state
statutes, and therefore full faith and credit does not require the forum state to
use the other state's statute to the exclusion of its own.32 In fact, the Court
said that Congress could prescribe the extraterritorial effect of state statutes.33
Because the framers intended the Clause to cover state legislative acts, 4 the
reasoning in Pacific and Hall suggests that Congress can create full faith
exceptions by excluding them from full faith legislation, the self-executing
portion of the Clause notwithstanding. 5
The Court's jurisprudence on exceptions has focused on the existence of
a conflicting state statute and, therefore, relies on the exclusion of statutes
extends to the courts of the state and not beyond because such a policy would implicate the
rights of the other states. Id. at 414-18. The Court also reasoned that the constitutional restric-
tions on suits against states only covered the federal judiciary and did not impact state tribunals.
Id. at 418-21. The Court noted that the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause requires states to recog-
nize the official acts of other states but that California did not have to recognize the Nevada
statutory liability limit if it violated a legitimate public policy of California. Id. at 421-24. The
Court considered other constitutional provisions relating to interstate relations, but found none
of them sufficient for the Court to require California to apply Nevada law. Id. at 424-26.
Consequently, the Court ruled that California could make Nevada a party in a suit in California,
and it could ignore Nevada's statutory liability limits. Id. at 427.
231. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
232. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 422-23 (quoting from Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1939)); Pacific Employers, 306 U.S. at 504-05
(deciding full faith and credit does not permit one state to legislate for another or project its
laws across state lines so that forum state is prevented from applying forum law to acts within
state). The issue in Pacific, an opinion authored by Justice Stone, was whether full faith and
credit required California to apply a Massachusetts workmen's compensation act where a
Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts employer suffered an injury in California. Id. at
497. The Court noted that both states had laws providing an exclusive remedy, so that the
application of one law would result in exclusion of the other. Id. at 500-0 1. The Court ruled
that full faith does not extend so far as to infringe on state sovereignty by substituting its own
statutes for those of another state. Id. at 501-02. The Court noted that when the forum state
has a statute expressing state policy and when the statute is to operate as the exclusive law
within the state, full faith and credit does not require application of a foreign state's law. Id. at
502-03. Consequently, California could apply its own law rather than that of Massachusetts.
Id. at 505.
233. See Hall, 440 U.S. at422 (quoting Pacific Employers, 306 U.S. at 502, as stating that
"in the case of statutes,... Congress has not prescribed [the extrastate effect], as it may under
the constitutional provision").
234. See supra notes 41-45, 53-63 and accompanying text (discussing inclusion of state
legislative acts in Clause).
235. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 422 (noting that Congress had not prescribed extraterritorial
effect of state statutes and further stating that "we think the conclusion is unavoidable that the
full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, the
conflicting statute of another state" (quoting Pacific Employers, 306 U.S. at 502)).
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from full faith legislation.3 6 However, a statutory conflict is not necessary,
as the Court noted in Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc.237 Justice Stone,
again writing for the Court, explained that the limits on full faith and credit
extend to the laws and policies of a state." s One state could threaten the
sovereignty of another state if it were able to implement the determinative
policy on domestic matters3 9 The extent to which one state could infringe
on the policies of another was therefore a matter for the Court, in the absence
of congressional action.24 To deny full faith and credit, the public policy
236. See 16A AM. JuR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 867 (1979) (discussing policy exceptions
to full faith and credit in terms of statutory conflicts).
237. 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
238. See Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941) (commenting
on limits of Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause). In Pink Justice Stone stated:
But the full faith and credit clause is not an inexorable and unqualified command.
It leaves some scope for state control within its borders of affairs which are peculi-
arly its own. This Court has often recognized that, consistent with the appropriate
application of the full faith and credit clause, there are limits to the extent to which
the laws and policy of one state may be subordinated to those of another.
Id. (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 497-98 (1941); Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273 (1935); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532 (1935)); see id. at 208-11 (deciding that full faith and credit does not require state to
enforce judgment from another state where liability is based on local contract, but may decide
issue based on local law and policy). In Pink, the Court addressed whether Georgia could deny
enforcement of a New York judgment against Georgia insurance policy holders where the
contract made the policyholder a member of the insurance company. Id at 204-06. The Court
noted that Georgia was free to make laws governing its domestic affairs and, therefore, it could
interpret the contract made in Georgia covering Georgia citizens, full faith and credit
nothwithstanding. Id. at 208-10. The Pink Court ruled that Georgia was justified in making its
determination based on "domestic law and policy which the full faith and credit clause does not
override." Id at 211.
239. See Pink, 314 U.S. at 210 (commenting on potential state sovereignty problems). The
Court stated:
It was the purpose of that provision to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under
the public acts and judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of
their validity in others. But the very nature of the federal union of states, to each
of which is reserved the sovereign right to make its own laws, precludes resort to
the Constitution as the means for compelling one state wholly to subordinate its
own laws and policy concerning its peculiarly domestic affairs to the laws and
policy of others.
Id.
240. See id. (noting Court has discretion in absence of congressional action). The Court
explained:
When such conflict of interest arises, it is for this Court to resolve itby determining
how far the full faith and credit clause demands the qualification or denial of rights
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concern of the forum must be strong enough to outweigh the other state's
interest.24
Recognition of foreign state marriages - a central issue in DOMA - has
been one of the public policy exceptions state courts have raised.24 Although
the underlying principle is that a marriage is valid everywhere as long as it
was valid in the state where celebrated (lex celebrationis), another state could
refuse to recognize such a marriage if it violated a strongly held public poli-
cy. 14 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the marriage exception, but for all
practical purposes has eliminated the exemption for divorces.2 4
In the earlier part of the twentieth century, during the most intense period
of Court activity over full faith and credit, commentators criticized the Court's
asserted under the laws of one state, that of the forum, by the public acts and judi-
cial proceedings of another.
Id. (citing Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)). But see
supra notes 190-211 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stone's view that Court could
decide scope of full faith in case only because Congress had not).
241. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text (discussing what amounts to balancing
test between full faith and public policy).
242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) & notes (1971) (citing
state cases invalidating marriages formalized in other states: Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726
(Conn. 1961); Davis v. Seller, 108 N.E.2d 656 (Mass. 1952); Wilkinsv. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d
65 (N.J. 1958)); 16A AM. JuR. 20 ConstitutionalLaw § 868 n.87 (1979) (citing Maryland case,
Henderson v. Henderson, 87 A.2d 403 (Md. 1952), as asserting right to not recognize out of
state marriages on public policy grounds but refusing to do so in case); Annotation, Recognition
By Forum State of Marriage Which, Although Invalid Where Contracted, Would Have Been
Valid if Contracted Within Forum State, 82 A.L.R.3D 1240, 1242 n.14 (1978) (citing DeFur
v. DeFur, 4 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1928); Portwoodv. Portwood, 109 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937, no writ); Kitzman v. Kitzman, 166 N.W. 789 (Wis. 1918) as cases raising issue of forum
state public policy); Annotation, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected by Local
Miscegenation Law, 3 A.L.RL2D 240 (1949 & Supp. 1985) (discussing state case law invoking
public policy principles for not recognizing marriage, and miscegenation as grounds made moot
by Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); see also Singh v. Singh, 569 A.2d 1112 (Conn.
1990) (reaffirming Connecticut's right to declare marriage invalid based on public policy).
243. See UNIF. MARRIAG-ANDDiVORCEACT § 210, 9AU.L.A. 176 (1987) (indicatingthat
"[a]ll marriages contracted... outside this State, that were valid at the time contracted or
subsequently by the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the domicil of the
parties, are valid in this State"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) &
notes (1971) (noting that marriages that satisfy requirements of state where contracted will be
recognized everywhere, "unless it violates the strong public policy of another State" having
most significant relationship to spouses and marriage); see also supra note 240 (discussing state
cases on nonrecognition of marriages). But see H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 38 (1996), reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2941 (dissenting view) (noting Supreme Court has never made
definitive ruling on interstate recognition of marriages).
244. See supra notes 220, 242 (discussing state case law and weakening of protection for
state policies on divorce after Williams I and Williams 11).
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enforcement of a public policy exception.24 Commentators argued against the
Court's creation of public policy exceptions based on the premise that the
exception power was given to Congress under the Clause.246 In 1935, Profes-
sor Ross criticized the Court for restricting the sweeping language of the Acts
of 1790 and 1804.247 He posited that by so doing the Court was infusing its
own discomfort with the mandatory conclusiveness of the congressional legis-
lation and the Clause into the Constitution, thereby restricting the power of
Congress in the future.24 According to Professor Ross, though, because the
language of the Clause expressly grants Congress the power to legislate in full
faith and credit, the Court's decisions may have to give way once Congress
exercises its power.249
In 1955, Professor Sumner more fully developed the distinction between
the power of the Court and the power of CongressY° Professor Sumner relied
245. See infra notes 246-75 and accompanying text (discussing commentators' criticism
of Supreme Court's public policy exception).
246. See Ross, supra note 44, at 157-58 (arguing that Congress is appropriate branch to
create exceptions).
247. See id. at 152 (stating that "[t]he Act of Congress sounds very sweeping... [b]ut such
a broad construction has not proved tolerable [to the Court]").
248. See id. at 157-58 (commenting that Court's decisions limit Congress's discretion
concerning Clause). Professor Ross states:
The constitution authorizes Congress to prescribe the inter-state effect of judicial
proceedings. Since Congress has laid out no lines of discrimination, the Supreme
Court might have held that there are none and that the obligation of "full faith and
credit" extends to every sort of judicial proceeding that its original state holds
effective; or, that until Congresg sets up standards of discrimination each state
remains free to make its own. Instead, the court has treated the constitutional section
in connection with the fourteenth amendment as self-executing and has worked out
its rules as assumed logical (?) corollaries of the constitutional obligation. If that is
what they are, how much play of legislative discretion is left to Congress?... [A]ny
congressional discretion must be exercised within the limits of what the Court will
recognize as "reasonable," the undefinable standard of which rests in the bosom of
the Court itself. But, no doubt, too, to be "reasonable" any such legislation will have
to follow the general distinctions already established by the Court.
Id. (citations omitted).
249. See id. at 183 (noting possible result should Congress exercise its power). Professor
Ross states:
The fact that.., the "full faith and credit" section... expressly authorize[s] Con-
gress to legislate for [its] implementing and completion will perhaps save the judi-
cially developed rules from being deemed entirely sacrosanct .... Assuming the
authority of Congress, it may be suggested that it would better legislate only piece-
meal for a time (as the Supreme Court has been doing) ....
Id.
250. See Sumner, supra note 31, at 236-41 (discussing nature of Full-Faith-and-Credit
Clause).
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heavily on the history of the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause to develop a view
of the framers' intent."' He noted that the framers' wrote the Clause with a
mandatory self-executing portion and a section that granted a broad power to
Congress to modify this requirement. 2 According to Professor Sumner, until
Congress acts, the Court is left to implement the self-executing nature of the
Clause, 3 with the rare exception for truly conflicting state public policies.'
Professor Sumner posited that, as a practical matter, Congress left the issue
to the Court in the absence of congressional "exceptions, qualifications, and
clarifications" 5 to full faith and credit, even though this was not the framers'
intent. 6 Professor Sumner's analysis highlights the difference between the
Court's role in interpreting a constitutional provision (the first part), and Con-
gress's role in exercising an enumerated power (the second part). They are
distinct roles and powers.
Justice Jackson observed that state public policy exceptions would
destroy the entire purpose behind the Clause, which was to place the interests
of the union ahead of those of the states. 7 If a state could deny faith and
credit to the laws of others, it was thereby adding to the power of its own
251. See id at 225-36 (discussing history of full faith and credit).
252. See id. at 239 (noting framers intended first part of Clause to be self-executing and
second part to give Congress power to modify first); see also id. at 236 (noting continuing
congressional failure "to make further use of the broad powers given it under the constitutional
clause").
253. See id. at 241 (commenting on Court's role in interpreting Clause). Professor Sum-
ner states:
Hence, the Federal statute has not thus far established the foundation. As a practical
matter the full faith and credit demanded by the Constitution is that which the
Supreme Court specifies. There is nothing whatsoever in the history of the clause
showing that this was the design of the framers. But, since the clause is self-exe-
cuting.., and since Congress has failed to carry out its task, there is little more that
can be done.
Id.
254. See id. at 246-49 (discussing exceptions to full faith and credit's purpose of uni-
formity based on state public policies).
255. Id. at 239.
256. See id. at 241 (providing Professor Sumner's explanation of framers' intent).
257. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 27 (addressing public policy concerns). Justice Jackson
states:
Always to be kept in mind in dealing with these problems is that the policy ultimately
to be served in application of the clause is the federal policy of "a more perfect
union" of our legal systems. No local interest and no balance of local interests can
rise above this consideration. It is hard to see how the faith and credit clause has any
practical meaning as to statutes if the Court should adhere to the statement that
".... a state is not required to enforce a law obnoxious to its public policy."
Id. (citing Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 507 (1941)).
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laws.258 Justice Jackson listed some of the areas in which states may have
irreconcilable differences z 9 and noted that resolving such conflicts should not
be left to the personal preferences of Supreme Court Justices.26 He noted that
the relationships of the states to one another and to the federal system should
form the basis of the solution,26' but provided no exact answer on the resol-
ution of these conflicts.262 Justice Jackson argued for a "truly national system
ofjustice 263 and called upon the legal community to come up with an answer
to the problems posed by the conflict between the Clause and state policies.2
Justice Jackson, citing the Yarborough dissent, dismissed Congress as the
solution to these problems because of congressional inaction,265 not because
of a lack of power.266 It appears, however, that Congress is the logical body
258. See id. at 33 (stating that "[a]nything taken from a state by way of freedom to deny
faith and credit to law of others is thereby added to the state by way of a right to exact faith and
credit for its own").
259. See id. at 27-28 (listing industrialization, resource protection, workmen's compensa-
tion, divorce, alienation of affection, breach of promise, domicile, estates, assessments, and
property as areas of state differences).
260. See id. at 28 (noting personal preferences are inappropriate to reconcile conflicting
state policies). Justice Jackson explains:
Certainly the personal preferences of the Justices among the conflicting state
policies is not a permissible basis of determining which shall prevail in a case. But
only a singularly balanced mind could weigh relative state interests in such subject
matter except by resort to what are likely to be strong preferences in sociology,
economics, governmental theory, and politics. There are no judicial standards of
valuation of such imponderables.
Id.
261. See id. at 28-29 (noting necessity that legal scholarship explore these relationships).
262. See id. at 28 (stating that "[tihe ultimate answer... will have to be based on con-
siderations of state relations to each other and to the federal system").
263. Id. at 34.
264. See id at 29 ("I could suggest no more engaging intellectual enterprise to which the
scholarship of our profession might turn than to try to find the wise answers on constitutional
grounds to these questions.").
265. See id. at 21-23 (commenting on congressional inaction). Justice Jackson notes that
the Court left areas open for congressional action, especially those relating to marriage:
Mr. Justice Stone, joined by Mr. Justice Cardozo, pointed out in a dissenting
opinion that "Much of the confusion and procedural deficiencies" in the matrimo-
nial field might be remedied by legislation. It is also suggested that Congress has
power to prescribe the type of divorce judgment that is entitled to extraterritorial
recognition. The Court has had no occasion to decide such questions, but I should
say it has been fairly ostentatious in leaving the way open to sustain such enact-
ments without embarrassment.
Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
266. See id. at 21 (stating that "Congress is invested with a range of power greatly ex-
ceeding that which it has seen fit to exercise").
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to answer Justice Jackson's call to balance "state relations to each other and
to the federal system, 26 7 because Congress represents the interests of the
states at the federal level.
Professor Radin, writing in the interim between the Williams Iand Wil-
liams II decisions, was squarely against the public policy exception which
would "whittle away" the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause.268 Using Williams I
as the example, Professor Radin argued that North Carolina's refusal to recog-
nize a Nevada divorce on public policy grounds, because of its short residency
requirement for people seeking a divorce, is equally offensive to Nevada.269
According to Professor Radin, North Carolina is powerless to prohibit such
evasions of its public policy in a federal system.7' He posited that while
states may have their own policies, people have the right to travel and live
among the states.27' Therefore, states could not shield themselves from one
another.272 Importantly, Professor Radin did not discuss the role Congress
could play under the second portion of the Clause. In this, the strongest
opposition to the notion of public policy exceptions among commentators,
Professor Radin did recognize one deviation from full faith, and it is quite
relevant to DOMA. 73 He believed that, theoretically, there could be a situa-
267. Id. at 28.
268. Max Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L.
R v. 1, 35 (1944).
269. See id. at 30 (providing Nevada-North Carolina divorce example). Professor Radin
explains:
If a small number succeed, for purposes that one state dislikes, in taking advantage
of our Federal system by moving to and from within the Union, as they have a
constitutional right to do, it is hard to see how anything can be done about it which
will not be just as offensive to another state.
Id. It should be noted that the next year Williams Ilrejected this perspective on the problem.
See supra note 221 (indicating North Carolina could ignore Nevada divorce decrees based on
domicile).
270. See Radin, supra note 268, at 32 ("What protesting states fail to realize is that so long
as we have a federal system like ours, a state is quite powerless to prevent this evasion.").
271. See id. at 29 (stating that "since the right of ingress and regress from one state to
another is a fundamental one, a state must endure the impairment of its policy which the action
of another state brings with it").
272. See id. (noting interplay between differing state policies). Professor Radin explains:
[I]t is impossible to see how under our Federal system of equal subsovereignties,
a state can be protected against the action of another state.... Our states are not
water-tight compartments.... That a state policy on moral as well as economic
issues is subject to this qualified frustration is... one of the prices we pay for the
maintenance of our Federal system.
Id.
273. See id at 35 (identifying situations that may require full faith and credit to give way,
especially in areas of marriage).
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tion in which a practice of one state was so "abhorrent" to the majority of the
others, such as non-traditional marriages, that another state could deny recog-
nition ofjudgments based on that practice.274 To Professor Radin, the notion
of such a situation was fanciful.275
II. DOMA as an Exercise of a Congressional Exception
An important criticism of DOMA is that it is outside the constitutional
congressional grant ofpower under the Full-Faith-and-Credit-Clause.1 6 Com-
mentators and those who opposed DOMA in Congress have raised two main
arguments on this point. First, a "negative" or exception power means that
Congress can negate the Clause through legislation, even to permit no faith at
all, and thus defeat the purpose of the Clause as "the strong unifying princi-
ple" for maximum enforcement in each state "of the obligations or rights
created orrecognizedby... sister states."277 Second, "congressional license""27
for states to do what the Court supposedly already authorizes them to do on
public policy grounds279 undercuts state protection under the Tenth Amend-
ment.28 °
Professor Tribe has argued that one cannot possibly read the power
granted to Congress under the Clause to "prescribe the Manner... and the
274. See id (hypothesizing state practices that could prove offensive to other states).
Radin asks:
Is the full faith and credit clause subject to any exception whatever?. In theory, we
may well imagine situations in which it might be forced to give way. Suppose a
particular state created situations which the great majority of the other states found
abhorrent. To recur to such matters as personal relations, could a state make the
extremer forms of incest lawful and would another state be compelled to recognize
a declaratory judgment, let us say, that such an incestuous marriage was valid? In
theory, I think, a state might do these things and in theory another state would be
constitutionally justified in denying judgments based on such situations either full
faith or any faith.
Id.
275. See id. (stating that "we are dealing with unrealities in these hypotheses").
276. See infra notes 277-95 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of DOMA).
277. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
278. Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note 17,
reprinted in 142 CONG. REc. S5933 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
279. See supra Part I1.C and accompanying text (discussing Court-created policy excep-
tions).
280. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."); H.R. REP.No. 104-664, at4l (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,2943-44
(dissenting view) (arguing DOMA impinges on 10th Amendment).
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Effect thereof 28 to authorize "no faith and credit at all."2 2 Professor Tribe
contends that to read the enabling power in such a way is a "play on words"
rather than a legal argument. 23 He reasons that such an interpretation is to
grant Congress the power to delegate a nullification authority to the states
which leads to unfettered latitude to ignore the acts of sister states and thereby
"gut" the self-executing portion of the Clause.2M His position reflects the
view that Congress may only exercise its full faith and credit power in further-
ance of enforcing state acts nationwide.285 The dissenting view in the House
debate over DOMA did not strongly adopt this position, but rather focused on
other constitutional arguments and the states' rights and public policy
concerns raised in Parts III.A and B.287
Another major criticism posits that DOMA's grant of power to the states
to ignore a particular act of another state is itself a violation of both the right
of states to ignore acts of other states and the right to have other states recog-
nize their own acts. 8 The dissenting congressional view argues that the
281. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
282. See Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note
17, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(questioning constitutionality of DOMA under Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause) (exclamation
excluded).
283. Id.
284. Id. Professor Tribe states:
To read the enabling sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to confer upon
Congress a power to delegate this sort of nullification authority - to read it... as
the proponents of this... law must read it if they are to treat it as the source of
power for the legislation they advocate- would entail the conclusion that Congress
may constitutionally decree that no Hawaii marriage, no California divorce, no
Kansas default judgment, no punitive damages award by any state court against a
civil rights lawyer- to suggest a few of infinitely many possible examples - need
to be given any legal effect at all by any State that chooses to avail itself of a
congressional license to ignore the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The enabling
sentence simply will not bear so tortured a reading.... Mhe Full Faith and Credit
Clause confers upon Congress no power to gut its self-executing requirements,
either piecemeal or all at once.
Id.
285. See Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 8, at 46 (Statement of Prof. Cass R. Sunstein)
(noting that this power is a "power of Congress, under the 'effect' clause of Article IV, section
1, of the Constitution, to increase the requirements of full faith and credit to sister state decrees
beyond what the Constitution alone would require" (quoting RUSSELL S. WENTRAUB, COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 278 (2d ed. 1986)).
286. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 40-43 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2942-46 (dissenting view) (arguing substantive due process and equal protection challenges to
DOMA).
287. See infra Parts I.A-B (discussing criticisms of DOMA).
288. See H.R. REP.No. 104-664, at38-39, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,2940-42
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power of states to ignore the actions of other states is a constitutional principle
and does not rely on congressional authority." 9 This dissenting view relies on
the statement of Professor Tribe for its reasoning that constitutional authority
to ignore other states' actions stems from judicially created full-faith-and-
credit exceptions, and that Congress lacks equivalent power to create such
exceptions.2'e The argument suggests that the Court may provide exceptions
to full faith and credit, but that Congress, through the grant of power in the
Clause itself to declare the effect, may not. The theory apparently contends
that legislation like DOMA places Congress in the position of exercising
constitutional interpretive powers or attempting to place itself in an authorita-
tive position vis-a-vis the states and the Constitution. As a result, Congress
exercises powers that it does not have in violation of the Tenth Amendment.291
Additionally, Professor Tribe argues that Congress's exercise of this
negative power places the acts of the "ignored" states into a "second-class
status."292 This exercise of power, according to Professor Tribe, destroys the
core principle of a "union of equal sovereigns" which the Constitution estab-
lishes.293 The dissenting view in the report concludes with the proposition that
Congress's use of an exception power undercuts the constitutional protections
(dissenting view) (discussing recognition among states).
289. See id. at 37 (arguing states' power of recognition derives from Constitution, not
Congress). The dissenting view explains:
[T]he power that states have to reject marriages of which they disapprove on policy
grounds derives directly from the Constitution and has never previously been held
to need any Congressional authorization, the fact that Congress... presumes to
give the states permission to do what virtually all states think they already now have
the power to do undercuts states rights.
Id.
290. See id. (citing Professor Tribe'l commentary). Professor Tribe states:
The essential point is that States need no congressional license to deny enforcement
of whatever sister-state decisions might fall within any judicially recognized full
faith and credit exception. The only authority the proposed statute could possibly
add to whatever discretion States already possess would be authority to treat a sister
State's binding acts as though they were the acts of a foreign nation- authority that
Congress has no constitutional power to confer.
Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note 17, reprinted
in 142 CONG. REc. S5933 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (emphasis
added).
291. See Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note
17, reprinted in 142 CONG.REC. S5932-33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(questioning constitutionality of DOMA under Tenth Amendment).
292. Id., reprinted in 142 CoNG. REc. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
293. See id. (stating that it "would destroy one of the Constitution's core guarantees that
the United States... will remain a union of equal sovereigns").
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for the state public policy exception.294 Critics argue that this negative use of
congressional power simultaneously brings into question the efficacy of the
state public policy exception and creates a sub-caste of states whose policies
are not in line with those of Congress. 95
A. Does DOMA Turn Full Faith and Credit on Its Head?
If Congress can create exceptions to full faith and credit without limita-
tion, then theoretically Congress can permit the states to grant no faith or
credit whatsoever.296 If Congress were to do so, it would defeat a purpose of
the Clause: to enhance the federal union through interstate recognition of
legal acts. Whether Congress would meet constitutional scrutiny in creating
such an exception is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this
Note. However, for full faith and credit purposes, DOMA addresses one
narrow issue: interstate recognition of same-sex marriages. 297 DOMA does
not prohibit recognition of this particular legal act by a state; instead, it is
optional.298 Because the focus of DOMA is so narrow, the real issue is
whether Congress can create any exceptions to the mandatory nature of full
faith and credit.
If Congress does not have the power to create exceptions to full faith and
credit in declaring the "Effect," then only two interpretations of the Clause are
possible: (1) the Clause is mandatory and therefore the "Effect" must refer to
"Manner" not "Acts"; or (2) the first portion of the Clause is not mandatory
294. See H.R. REP.No. 104-664, at4l (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,2944
(dissenting view) (arguing that constitutional provisions restrict Federal Government in full
faith and credit). The dissent explains:
This legislation enumerates a Federal power ... and therefore dangerously pro-
nounces, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, [("A maxim of statutory interpre-
tation meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
BLACK'sLAWDICTIONARY 581(6th ed. 1990).)] thatthe Federal government in fact
retains the power to limit full faith and credit. And it only need express that power
substantive issue by substantive issue. This is an arrogation of power to the federal
government .... Under the guise of protecting states' interests, [DOMA] would
infringe upon state sovereignty and effectively transfer broad power to the federal
government.
Id.
295. See id. (noting problems for interstate relations with DOMA).
296. See Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note
17, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(noting that Congress could require "no faith... at all").
297. See Defense ofMarriageAct § 2, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997) (providing
exemption from full faith and credit of same-sex marriages).
298. See id. (granting permission to not recognize same-sex marriages, but not mandating
that outcome).
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and therefore Congress can require full faith where the Court has not.299
Unless one of these interpretations is correct, the power the Constitution
grants to Congress is a nullity.3" The only support for the first proposition is
found in Justice Story's Commentaries as discussed in Part II.B.3 1 While
"Effect" referring to "Manner" is a plausible reading of the words of the
Clause, it is unlikely that granting power to Congress to set up procedural
rules for proving state legal acts was the concern underlying the framers
opposed to the final version of the Clause when they claimed it would usurp
the powers of states." 2 Yet, this is one of Professor Tribe's arguments. 303
The second position comports with the Supreme Court practice of creat-
ing limited exceptions to full faith while noting the lack of congressional
action3° and Congress's recent pre-DOMA full-faith legislation. 5 The
Court, in this view, interprets what the mandatory nature of the Clause re-
quires of the states, and Congress may fill in any Court-created exceptions
through the exercise of its power to declare the effect of state acts." 6 The
problem with this position is history. The framers intended to give to Con-
gress broad powers over full faith and credit.0 7 The concept of Congress
playing the role of plugging the Court-created gaps in the Clause is novel, and
the records of the Constitutional Convention do not support it.08 This posi-
299. See supra Part lI.B. 1.b (discussing two views in Story's Commentaries).
300. See supra note 151-53 and accompanying text (noting that if declaring effect still
requires mandatory full faith then Congress's power is meaningless).
301. See supra Part II.B.l.b (discussing Story's view that "Effect" referred to "Manner").
302. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text (positing that Story is incorrect in his
view).
303. See Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note
17, reprinted in 142 CONG. REc. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(arguing that Congress is limited to procedural effects among states). Professor Tribe states:
Power to specify how a sister-state's official acts are to be "proved" and to prescribe
"the effect thereof' includes no power to decree that, if those official acts offend a
congressional majority, the need to be given no effect whatsoever by any State that
happens to share Congress's substantive views.
Id.
304. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing limited exceptions in light of congressional in-
action).
305. See supra note 16 (citing recent congressional legislation covering child custody,
child support, and protective orders).
306. See Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note
17, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S5932-33 (daily ed. June 6,1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(claiming Court creates exceptions and Congress furthers full faith).
307. See supra Part II.A (discussing grant of broad power to Congress during Constitu-
tional Convention).
308. See supra Part II.A (indicating nothing in debates supporting this position).
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tion also raises a practical problem. If the Court re-interprets the first section
of the Clause based upon its plain language of mandatory absolutism, then no
exceptions will exist for Congress to handle and "absurd" results will occur." 9
The second sentence of the Clause would be meaningless.
In enacting DOMA, Congress adopted the view that the Clause mandates
full faith as a general rule, with Congress making such exceptions as it deems
necessary. 0 This position tracks Madison's final change to the mandatory
and precatory language of the Clause.3 1' This position is also consistent with
the concerns of the Court and commentators when the Court was creating
exceptions in the face of congressional inaction. However, Congress did not
go as far as Justice Black in declaring that exceptions were within Congress's
sole province.312 Mills, the Court's now limited first pronouncement on the
Clause, supports Justice Black's position that is based on the plain language
of the Clause. 1 3 In Mills, the Court interpreted the Clause as absolutely
mandatory with only such modifications as Congress prescribed. 314 The Court
read the Clause as displacing background principles of law to establish new
relationships among the states and between the states and the federal govern-
ment.31'5 Absurd results could occur with such an interpretation, but Congress
could address those absurdities if they arise. This is the system Justice Black
and the Justice Story of Mills envisioned.1 6
309. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
310. See Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 8, at 23 (1996) (Statement of Prof. Lynn D.
Wardle) (arguing for Congressional exception power). Professor Wardle states:
Congress is empowered to specify by statute how States are to treat laws from other
States. Read together, the two sentences of Article IV, section 1 logically suggest
this interpretation: While full faith and credit is the rule that is, while States are
generally obligated to treat laws of other States as they would their own Congress
retains a discretionary power to carve out such exceptions as it deems appropriate.
id.
311. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (discussing switch in permissive and
mandatory language).
312. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (noting Justice Black's dissent in Wil-
liams II); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 25 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2929 (illustrating that both Congress and Supreme Court have role in full faith and credit).
313. See supra notes 102-15,223-24 and accompanying text (noting both views required
conclusive full faith and credit because of both congressional legislation and Full-Faith-and-
Credit Clause).
314. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484-85 (1813) (noting Clause was
mandatory and Congress prescribed effect).
315. Id. But see Kogan, supra note 97, at 280-83 (discussing opposing state court view
that Clause did not displace background common law).
316. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text (summarizing views of Justice Black
and Justice Story writing for Court in Mills).
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Under the interpretation of either the 104th Congress or Justice Black,
the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause empowers Congress to protect and admin-
ister the unifying principles ofthe Clause.317 If necessary, Congress can exer-
cise its power through the creation of exceptions. Any other position is
inconsistent with the history of the Clause or logic, because the framers
foresaw a broad role, and created a broad power, for Congress.31 Congress's
role is meaningless if full faith is already mandatory and Congress is power-
less to create exceptions.
B. Does DOMA Violate States 'Rights?
The argumentthat DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment emanates from
the view that Congress has no enumerated power to enact DOMA.319 As the
dissenting report indicates, however, DOMA implicates the congressional
power enumerated in the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause.32 The real concern
is that Congress exercised this power in an unconstitutional manner by claim-
ing for itself the authority to grant exemptions from full faith to the states.
321
The states do not have the power to limit full faith and credit on their own.3"
The only exceptions to full faith to date have been those the Court has recog-
nized.3" If Congress is exercising a power it does not have, it does so at the
expense of the Court, not the states. This is because one state's marriages,
which sister states refuse to recognize as a result of DOMA, never had an
absolute expectation of full faith recognition in light of the Court's power
over exceptions.324 The position that DOMA infringes on states' rights is hard
317. See supra notes 310-16 and accompanying text (comparing similar views of Justice
Black, that only Congress can create exceptions, and of 104th Congress, that both Congress and
Court have role).
318. See supra Parts II.A-B (discussing framers' intent and difficult logic of Story's
Commentaries).
319. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 41 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2943-44 (dissenting view) (arguing DOMA violates states' rights). The dissenting view explains:
The clear expression in this legislation that the Congress has a role in determining
when a state may not offer full faith and credit creates a standard of Federal control
antithetical to conservative philosophy and theTenthAmendment: that powers not
enumerated for the Federal Government are reserved to the States.
Id.
320. See id (noting that Congress, by enacting DOMIA, does utilize the implementing
authority which the Clause grants to it).
321. See id. (claiming power exercised by Congress is seizure of power).
322. However, this should be a logical result if one accepts a Tenth Amendment argument
against DOMA.
323. See supra Part II.C (discussing Court-created exception to full faith and credit).
324. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text (discussing Court's policy exception
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to reconcile with the claim that the Court is the sole arbiter, or even an arbiter
at all, of what the Clause requires." In fact, DOMA, by permitting states to
choose whether to recognize same-sex marriages of other states, elevates the
rights of all states to decide this question within their own borders."2 Those
states expecting recognition of their own same-sex marriages do not face a
complete bar with DOMA.327 Congress did not forbid states from giving full
faith to such marriages, and whether Congress could is an unexplored ques-
tion.
Even if Congress can grant exceptions, a further issue is whether Con-
gress can do so "substantive issue by substantive issue." '328 Justice Black
thought so. 29 Selecting one policy as the "approved" policy by denying full
faith to opposite perspectives presents a problem for a nation of equal sover-
eignties. Those states that are on the "wrong" side become a sub-caste -
outsiders from the national viewpoint.30 As a result, full faith would not
require sister states to recognize legal acts in opposition to this viewpoint,
although all states must recognize acts which Congress has not disapproved
or which the Court has not exempted. 31 If no state recognizes a Hawaiian
same-sex marriage, full faith will still require Hawaii to recognize the mar-
riages of all of its sister-states, unless it can articulate a strong public policy
against doing so and convince the Court to agree.3 2 Any state with a minority
policy on some issue could find its legal acts stripped of significance beyond
its borders if a congressional majority disapproves of its policy. Congress
clearly opposed the notion of same-sex marriages.333 Not only does DOMA
concerning marriage).
325. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (discussing Court as final arbiter of
full faith and credit).
326. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 9-10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2913-14 (claiming DOMA advances rights of states to decide marriage issue internally).
327. See id. at 25, 29-30, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2929, 2933-34 (noting
states are still permitted to recognize same-sex marriages under DOMA).
328. 142 CONG. REc. S10,077 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (testimony of Rabbi David Super-
stein).
329. See supra note 223 (arguing Congress should handle interstate divorce issues).
330. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (raising issue that DOMA might create
sub-caste of states).
331. See Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note
17, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(noting potential disparity among state positions).
332. See supra Part H.C (discussing policy exceptions to full faith, including marriage).
333. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12-16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2916-2920 (noting disapproval over notion of same-sex marriage and support for government
role of nurturing heterosexual marriage).
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permit states to deny full faith to same-sex marriages, it also creates a defini-
tion of marriage for federal purposes that excludes same-sex marriages and
thereby expresses federal disapproval of a potential state policy.33 Nonethe-
less, by allowing states to choose whether to recognize such marriages, Con-
gress left the matter for each state to decide on its own."'
DOMA targets the effect such marriages could have on other states and
the federal government.336 Congress feared that a state would use the Clause
to impose its policy upon all the states.337 The majority believed that the
Constitution designated Congress as the appropriate branch to resolve difficult
interstate situations such as this impending conflict of state policies.33 Con-
gress's authority to deny full faith on particular substantive issues would give
it influential power over the states holding minority views.339 At the Constitu-
334. See Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1997) (defining mar-
riage for federal purposes as one man and one woman).
335. See H.R.REP.No. 104-664, at25, 29-30, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,2929,
2933-34 (claiming DOMA permits each state to decide whether to recognize same-sex mar-
riages).
336. See id. at 29, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2933 (discussing DOMA's
impact on states). The House Report states:
The Committee believes that Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act strongly
supports a proper understanding of federalism and state sovereignty. Section 2 is
an effort to protect the right of the various States to retain democratic control over
the issue of how to define marriage. It does so in a moderate fashion, intruding
only to the extent necessary to forestall the impending legal assault on traditional
state marriage laws. It does so in reliance on an express constitutional grant of
congressional authority.
Id. The Report also states: "Recognition of same-sex 'marriage' in Hawaii could also have
profound implications for federal law as well." Id. at 10, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2914.
337. See id. at 7, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2911 ("[T]he... lawyers driving
the Hawaiian lawsuit have made plain that they consider Hawaii to be only the first step in
a national effort to win by judicial fiat the right to same-sex 'marriage.' And the primary
mechanism for nationalizing their break-through . . . will be the Full Faith and Credit
Clause...").
338. See id. at 26, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930 (quoting Prof. Maurice
Holland). Professor Holland explains:
(The Framers) understood that there would be occasions when the legislative power
of two or more states would overlap, thus engendering actual or potential conflict.
The delicate, and largely political, task of resolving such conflicts was therefore
(assigned) to Congress, with the expectation that it would function as a kind of
referee for their settlement when required.
Id.
339. See Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note
17, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(noting power Congress will have over states on substantive issues).
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tional Convention, Mr. Randolph expressed precisely this fear in his objection
to the addition of the words "and the Effect thereof."34 The Convention's
adoption of the proposed language, despite Mr. Randolph's concern, strongly
supports Congress's position that it has the enumerated power to enact
DOMA."' The discomfort that opponents ofDOMA may feel at this exercise
of congressional power in choosing a favorite among state policies may not
rest on true constitutional concerns, but rather on unfamiliarity - Congress
may have finally exercised a power granted to it after a 209-year wait.
IV Conclusion
History reveals that the framers gave Congress broad power over inter-
state relations, which was followed by a lack of congressional desire to
regulate the details of full faith and credit.342 To deny broad powers to Con-
gress today would embody the principle of atrophy into the Constitution - use
it or lose it. To deny Congress the power to create exceptions to full faith and
credit would relegate this broad power to procedural details or gap filling for
Court-created holes.343 Such an interpretation cannot withstand historical
scrutiny and would require a re-evaluation of all of the congressional full-faith
legislation and the entire full-faith jurisprudence.3"
Of the different perspectives on full faith and credit, Congress's view of
its power to enact DOMA is a middle position. Congress's view is that the
Court interprets the requirements that the mandatory first section of the Clause
places on the states, while Congress modifies the requirements as necessary
through its optional powers under the second section. 4 Professor Tribe's
interpretation, on the other hand, places most of the power with the Court and
340. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing Mr. Randolph's objection to
proposed Clause).
341. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Convention's desire for
broad congressional power over full faith).
342. See supra Parts II.A-II.B (discussing action of Constitutional Convention and
subsequent lack of congressional action).
343. See supra notes 304-09 and accompanying text (discussing role of Congress as gap
filling for Court).
344. See, e.g., Act ofMay 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (currentversion at 28 U.S.C.§ 1738
(1994)) (prescribing effect of various interstate acts); Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56,2 Stat. 298
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (1994)) (same); Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of
1980, Pub. L. 96-611,94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994)) (same); Full Faith
and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4064 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994)) (same); Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1930 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994)) (same).
345. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 8-9 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2912-13 (noting role for both Congress and Supreme Court); see also supra note 308 (quoting
statement of Prof. Wardle).
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leaves Congress the minor details of filling in the holes.346 Justice Black, at
the other end of the spectrum, believed the Court had no role except to enforce
full faith without exception, and he left determining any variations to Con-
gress.347 Justice Black's position is closest to the plain language of the Clause
given Madison's modification of its mandatory and permissive nature. 48
However, Congress's interpretation reflects practicality in light of nearly 200
years of congressional inaction and Court interpretation and modification of
full faith and credit. Under either of these two interpretations, DOMA sur-
vives.
More important than the issue of same-sex marriage is Congress's
decision to exercise its power to create an exception to full faith and credit for
the first time in the nation's history. Never before has it been necessary for
Congress to take such a step, and it does so now over a controversial social
issue. After DOMA, Congress may create exceptions to full faith and credit
on a variety of topics for any number of reasons.349 This may have been the
purpose of the Clause, but the extraordinary delay in implementation may set
the stage for unexpected changes in the fabric of the federal union. DOMA
reflects the diversity of social perspectives in the country and the challenges
our system faces when these perspectives come into conflict. On the horizon
await more conflicts of varying divisiveness. The framers intended Congress,
as the federal embodiment of the states and the people, to play the role of
"referee" under the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause to prevent the view of one
state from overriding that of others.350
346. See Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note
17, reprintedin 142 CONG.REc. S5932-33 (daily ed. June 6,1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(discussing limited role for Congress in full faith and credit while Court interprets Clause).
347. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Black's view of
primary congressional role in full faith).
348. See supra notes 59-63 (discussing Madison's amendment to Clause during debates).
349. See Letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward Kennedy, supra note
17, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(listing contracts, divorces, and any other issues).
350. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 26, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930
(noting role of Congress under Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause).
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